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A B S T R A C T
Five studies test the relationship between overconfidence and perceived leadership suitability. Study 1, a field study wherein HR consultants assessed candidates for
an advertised leadership position, finds that overconfidence positively predicts hiring recommendations. Study 2, in which participants delivered a five-minute job
talk to an expert panel, finds that overconfidence buffers social stress, thereby improving participants' job pitches. Study 3, which tested the effect of confidence on
leadership selection at different levels of manipulated competence, finds that regardless of competence, confidence increases perceived leadership potential. Study 4,
finds that within the context of the 2016 US Primaries, voters were swayed by candidates' confidence, regardless of candidate competence. Study 5, an agent-based
simulation, demonstrates that if candidates adjust to voter preferences for confidence, competent candidates become less likely to be elected. These findings suggest
that overconfidence manifests behavioral displays that activate people's implicit leadership theories, thereby increasing perceptions of leadership potential.
Introduction
Confidence is a compelling trait for an aspiring leader to possess
(Hogan, Curphy, & Hogan, 1994; Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1991; Magee &
Frasier, 2014), giving rise to behavioral signals – strong opinions, de-
fined ideas, a calm and relaxed bearing, and a general demeanor of self-
assurance – that others read as competence and leadership potential
(Anderson & Kilduff, 2009). However, because overconfidence gives rise
to these very same behavioral signals (Driskell, Olmstead, & Salas,
1993; Radzevick & Moore, 2011), selection committees are faced with
the challenge of differentiating between those candidates whose con-
fidence is warranted, and those whose confidence arises from an ex-
aggerated belief in their actual competence (i.e., the overconfident).
Indeed, we suggest that the degree to which candidates misperceive
themselves to possess superior competence, relative to the reality of their
actual competence, influences the nature and strength of the behavioral
signals they emit, and ultimately, the impression they leave on selection
committees. Such is the focus of this paper, wherein we suggest that due
to its self-deceptive nature, candidates' overconfidence seamlessly pig-
gybacks on the information value of confidence, triggering implicit
theories or schemas of leadership, and providing an advantage in the
context of leadership selection.
Leadership scholars have thus far produced scant empirical work on
the role of candidates' overconfidence in leadership selection contexts.
This is not to say that the clues are not there – we know that over-
confidence (operationalized as overestimation of past performance) has
been observed in emergent leadership (Reuben, Rey-Biel, Sapienza, &
Zingales, 2012). Narcissism, a conceptual cousin of overconfidence, has
also been shown to be positively related to leadership emergence and
performance (Grijalva, Harms, Newman, Gaddis, & Fraley, 2015;
Nevicka, De Hoogh, Van Vianen, Beersma, & McIlwain, 2011), espe-
cially during the initial stages of team formation (Ong, Roberts, Arthur,
Woodman, & Akehurst, 2016). Leadership emergence has also been
shown to be related to high general self-efficacy (Foti & Hauenstein,
2007), which in turn has been used to explain the robust association
between confidence and effective leadership (McCormick, 2001). In
addition, overconfidence, operationalized as overestimation of preci-
sion in forecasts of project payoffs, has been modeled in corporate
leadership promotion (Goel & Thakor, 2008). Specifically, Goel and
Thakor (2008) find that within the context of an intrafirm tournament,
wherein managers compete to maximize shareholder value, over-
confident managers overestimate the precision of private information,
leading them to underestimate project risk. This increases outcome
variance, which on a good day increases firm value and the likelihood
of the overconfident manager being promoted to CEO. However, Goel
and Thakor (2008) also demonstrate that the relationship between
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overconfident CEO's and firm value is non-monotonic – while moderate
overconfidence diminishes underinvestment and increases firm value,
higher levels of overconfidence lead to overinvestment, which de-
creases firm value.
We make four empirical and theoretical contributions to the lit-
erature with this work. First, we explicate contrasting theoretical ac-
counts concerning the functional utility of overconfidence – in-
trapersonal (Dunning, Leuenberger, & Sherman, 1995; Taylor & Brown,
1988) versus interpersonal (Anderson, Brion, Moore, & Kennedy, 2012;
Murphy et al., 2015; von Hippel & Trivers, 2011) – and we move to-
ward ‘consensus creation’ (Hollenbeck, 2008) by demonstrating the
relationship between these intrapersonal and interpersonal advantages
that follow from overconfidence. Specifically, using Brunswik's (1956)
lens model as a conceptual framework, we demonstrate that over-
confidence leads to an advantage in leadership competitions (i.e., the
interpersonal account) because of the intrapsychic buffer against social
stress that it provides (i.e., the intrapersonal account). Most previous
studies on the positive effects of overconfidence in the context of lea-
dership have focused on leadership emergence (e.g., Grijalva et al.,
2015; Reuben et al., 2012). While it is true that the qualities that fa-
cilitate leadership emergence and selection likely overlap, the processes
are quite distinct. Emergence occurs naturally within groups and
without the premeditated intention of selecting a leader, whereas se-
lection follows from identifying a need for a leader who is then pur-
posely sought out and scrutinized by a panel or committee in an effort
to assess his or her leadership potential. As such, leadership competi-
tions differ from emergent leadership contexts insofar as they have the
potential to evoke a stronger stress response. We suggest that leadership
selection contexts may be especially well suited to the anxiety buffering
effects of overconfidence and the confidence signaling that follows.
Second, we advance implicit leadership theory by suggesting that
overconfidence acts as an intrapsychic mechanism that manifests be-
haviors that then activate implicit theories or schemas associated with
leadership. Implicit leadership theory is a cognitive theory of leadership
which posits that decision-makers possess schemas that shape their
implicit theories of what constitutes a leader (Calder, 1977; Den Hartog
et al., 1999; Epitropaki & Martin, 2004; Lord, Foti, & De Vader, 1984;
Lord, Foti, & Phillips, 1982; Offermann, Kennedy Jr, & Wirtz, 1994).
Individuals who fit people's shared leader-related theories or schemas
tend to emerge as leaders within groups (Brown & Lord, 2001; Hogg,
2001). Surprisingly, (over)confidence has not yet been explicitly iden-
tified as a schema-activating component of implicit leadership theories,
despite longstanding recognition of the importance of confidence to
leadership (Hogan et al., 1994; Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1991; Magee &
Frasier, 2014). Nonetheless, Lord et al.'s (1984) seminal work on im-
plicit leadership theory produced a pool of 59 leader attributes, nine of
which are conceptually related to (over)confidence – outgoing, de-
termined, decisive, strong character, strong convictions, charismatic,
persuasive, persistent, outspoken. We build on these suggestive findings
by positioning candidate overconfidence as an antecedent of these
leader prototypic behavioral expressions identified by Lord et al.
(1984).
Third, we answer calls to generalize laboratory findings regarding
the status enhancing effects of overconfidence to a field setting
(Anderson et al., 2012) where we offer the first empirical investigation
into the effects of overconfidence in leadership selection. Although
status and leadership are conceptually different (e.g., Goldhamer &
Shils, 1939; Magee & Galinsky, 2008), previous theoretical conceptions
indicate that status involves leadership and vice versa (e.g., Bales et al.,
1951; Berger et al., 1972) and that both concepts correlate very highly
(Anderson et al., 2012). We thus expect that any status enhancing
benefits of overconfidence will be especially pronounced in a leadership
selection context, where there is a strong preference for holistic, in-
tuitive approaches that rely on behavioral observations from interviews
and other assessment center exercises (Highhouse, 2002, 2008; Lievens,
Highhouse, & De Corte, 2005). These more intuitive approaches tend to
gather little objective information that would allow testing the accuracy
of the candidate's confidence signaling and may therefore leave selec-
tion panels vulnerable to misperceiving mere overconfidence as justi-
fied confidence that is matched by high competence.
Fourth, using a two-pronged approach (i.e., experimental and cross
sectional) we contribute to the ongoing discussion regarding the
boundaries of (over)confident signaling, when such signaling is ac-
companied by cues of low competence (Kennedy, Anderson, & Moore,
2013; Tenney, Spellman, & MacCoun, 2008). First, using an experi-
ment, we examine the robustness of the effects of overconfident sig-
naling when paired with objective evidence of candidates' competence
levels. We then test these relationships in one of the most important
leadership competitions – the 2016 US presidential elections – where
we again examine the effects of perceived confidence on voting inten-
tions at different levels of perceived competence. Finally, using an
agent-based simulation we extrapolate from the observations made in
the context of the 2016 US election and provide an illustration of the
longer-term societal consequences of selecting overconfident leaders
into top political positions.
While we ground this work in the context of leadership selection
and implicit leadership theory, it will no doubt be of interest to re-
searchers interested in leadership emergence, charismatic and trans-
formational leadership, power and status, and those following the im-
portant discussion of managerial judgments and decisions and their
impact on firm performance (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Hayward &
Hambrick, 1997; Hiller & Hambrick, 2005; Li & Tang, 2010;




Leadership selection refers to a formal process in which (i) the need
for a leader is recognized, (ii) potential candidates are identified, (iii)
those candidates are given the opportunity to be considered by a panel
or committee, (iv) whose task it is to scrutinize the appropriateness of
the candidates for the role. In some cases, this will involve the con-
sideration of external candidates, though more frequently those se-
lected for formal leadership roles are existing organizational members
whose particular skills, abilities, and characteristics are “visible” and
perceived to be well matched to leadership (Fiedler, 1996). As such,
leadership selection is founded on people’ s implicit leadership theories
and leadership prototypes (Lord et al., 1982; Lord et al., 1984; Lord &
Maher, 1990; Vardiman, Houghton, & Jinkerson, 2006). If a target in-
dividual is seen to fit the prevailing leadership prototype, they are more
likely to be viewed as a leader and to win deference and respect within
informal social hierarchies. These individuals gain visibility and social
capital, which enhances their chances of eventually being selected for a
formal leadership position (Vardiman et al., 2005). There is a wealth of
empirical research on the individual traits and characteristics that feed
into leader prototypicality, with intelligence/cognitive ability, emo-
tional intelligence, conscientiousness, extraversion, dominance, emo-
tional stability, gender role, and generalized self-efficacy being the most
reliable predictors of leader emergence and selection (e.g., Day,
Shleicher, Unckless, & Hiller, 2002; Fitzsimmons & Callan, 2016;
Gershenoff & Foti, 2003; Lord, De Vader, & Alliger, 1986; Rubin,
Bartels, & Bommer, 2002; Smith & Foti, 1998; Taggar, Hackew, & Saha,
1999; Wolff, Pescosolido, & Druskat, 2002). Although (over)confidence
does not yet explicitly feature as a constituent of leader prototypicality,
there is strong suggestive evidence in the existing literature to motivate
the current research. We review and discuss these throughout the fol-
lowing sections.
Defining overconfidence
To understand how overconfidence might provide an advantage to
aspiring leaders it is important to understand what is meant by
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overconfidence and to consider the roots of the error. Overconfidence is
broadly defined as an inaccurate and exaggerated perception of one's
abilities or knowledge (for a review, see Moore & Healy, 2008). People
can be overconfident in three main ways: 1) they might overplace
themselves relative to others by believing themselves to be better than
others, even when they are not (e.g., Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Kruger &
Mueller, 2002; Larrick, Burson, & Soll, 2007), 2) they might over-
estimate their abilities or performance relative to objective criteria
(e.g.,Buehler, Griffin, & Ross, 1994; Krueger & Wright, 2011), or 3) they
might exhibit overprecision by expressing excessive certainty regarding
the accuracy of their knowledge or beliefs (e.g., Hill, Gray, Carter, &
Schulkin, 2005; Daniel, Hirshleifer, & Sabrahmanyam, 1998). Thus,
people are overconfident either when they believe themselves to be
more competent than is warranted by objective measures of compe-
tence, and/or when they believe themselves to be better than others
when in fact they are not.
Overconfidence is not equivalent to the strong confidence of a
person of high competence whose self-knowledge is accurately cali-
brated, although we contend both result in the same behavioral dis-
plays. Whereas confidence gives rise to behavioral signaling that re-
flects one's actual abilities or potential, overconfidence manifests as
falsely inflated signals of one's competence. This distinction between
confidence and overconfidence is an important one as it implies ob-
servers should infer different information from overconfidence and
confidence. Nonetheless, we suggest that because the overconfident are
unaware that their self-opinions are inflated, they do not emit the
telltale signs of conscious bluff or deceit, which can be observed or
detected by others (Vrij, Edward, Roberts, & Bull, 2000), and which
tend to result in perceptions of overconfidence and social disapproval
(e.g., Colvin, Block, & Funder, 1995; Jones & Shrauger, 1970; Schlenker
& Leary, 1982; Tenney et al., 2008).
Contextualizing (over)confidence within implicit leadership theory
Although research investigating the role of overconfidence in lea-
dership is limited (Meikle, Tenney, & Moore, 2016), there is a clearly
documented relationship between confidence and leadership (De
Cremer & Van Knippenberg, 2004; Hogan et al., 1994; Kirkpatrick &
Locke, 1991; Magee & Frasier, 2014), suggesting the possibility that
confidence may feature in people's implicit theories of what constitutes
a leader. For instance, confident leaders tend to accept more challenges
and set more difficult goals (Luthans, Luthans, Hodgetts, & Luthans,
Luthans, Hodgetts, & Luthans, 2001), to be less sensitive to risks (Black
& Porter, 2000; Northouse, 1997), and to inspire followers to work
toward their objectives (Luthans & Peterson, 2002). We suggest that
even when confidence is not well matched by ability, as is the case with
overconfidence, it will still activate people's implicit leadership
schemas, and so increase perceptions of leadership potential.
As early as 1948, Stogdill identified self-confidence as predictive of
emergent leadership. Hollander's (1958) notion of idiosyncrasy credits,
which are granted to legitimate leaders, might provide license for, and
even expectations of displays of confidence and bold self-assurance.
Indeed, Kirkpatrick and Locke (1991, p. 54) astutely observed that “not
only is the leader's self-confidence important, but so is others' percep-
tion of it.” They go on to describe how displays of self-confidence in-
spire followers' self-confidence, as well as confidence in the decisions
made and directions set by the leader. This sentiment emerges again in
the work of De Cremer and Van Knippenburg (2004, p. 142) who state
that “by communicating the expectation of success, leader self-con-
fidence may render the leader more attractive and charismatic, and
motivate involvement in the job.”. And in their work on the foundations
of power and status – both closely tied to leadership (e.g., Eden &
Leviatan, 1975) – Magee and Frasier (2014) describe how perceptions
of power are primarily based on displays of confidence, assertiveness,
and the appearance of being in control.
Alongside these accounts of the centrality of confidence to leader-
ship, implicit leadership theory has to date invoked only an implicit
relationship between confidence and leadership. As noted above, al-
though the earliest attempts to produce a list of qualities that feature in
people's leadership schemas did not explicitly identify confidence per
se, roughly 15% of the 59 leader-related constructs that were identified
follow from or overlap with the construct of confidence (Lord et al.,
1984). To the extent that (over)confidence might, as we suggest, acti-
vate people's implicit leadership schemas, the more a target individual
appears confident, the more likely it is that he or she will be categorized
as a leader (Foti & Luch, 1992; Offermann et al., 1994). Once such a
label is in place, selective attention and memory willreinforce the initial
judgment, even if the label is not subsequently justified by objective
data (Shondrick, Dinh, & Lord, 2010).
Related constructs
Scholars have also explored what we see as conceptually related
constructs, such as leader hubris (Judge, Piccolo, & Kosalka, 2009),
charismatic leadership (Antonakis, Bastardoz, Jacquart, & Shamir,
2016; Antonakis, Fenley, & Liechti, 2011), and even transformational
leadership (Bass & Riggio, 2006). We briefly review these related
streams of research to contextualize overconfidence in relation to these
constructs.
Hubris refers to exaggerated pride, self-confidence, or arrogance (De
Vries, 1990). In part, leaders' hubris is a consequence of the consistent
deference shown to leaders by obsequious followers (De Vries, 1990). In
the absence of question, challenge, or rebuke, leaders' hubris blooms
and can give rise to poor decisions. For instance, Owen and Davidson
(2009) described the role of hubristic behaviors among American pre-
sidents, linking these to events such as the American sponsored Bay of
Pigs invasion, Nixon's Watergate scandal, and Bush's decision to invade
Iraq. We see strong parallels between hubris and overconfidence, and
indeed, the two constructs have at times been used interchangeably
(e.g., Hayward, Shepherd, & Griffin, 2006). However, others (e.g.,
Shipman & Mumford, 2011) have noted that hubris extends beyond
overconfidence to “ego”, excessive pride, and a generalized sense of
exaggerated self-worth. Perhaps most noteworthy is the fact that hubris
has been most often discussed within the context of the “dark side” of
leader traits (Judge et al., 2009), whereas leader confidence has been
positioned as a universally desired positive trait within leadership re-
search (Den Hartog et al., 1999; Hogan et al., 1994; Kirkpatrick &
Locke, 1991; Magee & Frasier, 2014). And even when this confidence
exceeds competence (i.e., overconfidence), the consequences do not
necessarily have to be negative. For example, overconfidence has been
related to innovation (Engelen, Neumann, & Schwens, 2015) and
greater stock return volatility (Hirshleifer, Low, & Teoh, 2012).
Charismatic leadership, which has been shown to manifest both
positive and negative outcomes (Howell & Avolio, 1992), refers to
symbolic leader influence rooted in emotional and ideological founda-
tions. Charisma's effects manifest in observer/follower attributions of
the leader, which follow from leaders' (trainable) verbal and nonverbal
influence tactics (Antonakis et al., 2011, 2016). Perceptions of charisma
have also been shown to interact with perceptions of crisis in the pre-
diction of leadership emergence, although in unstable ways (Pillai,
1996; Pillai & Meindl, 1991; Pillai & Meindl, 1998; Williams, Pillai,
Deptula, & Lowe, 2012). Although not the focus of the current research,
it is possible that overconfident individuals are more likely to appear as
charismatic in the eyes of observers. As such, overconfidence might be
positioned as a potential antecedent of charisma. Importantly however,
we do not believe that overconfidence as we conceptualize it (i.e., as a
manifestation of self-deception) can be taught or trained, such that
anybody can learn to consciously enact overconfidence displays, as has
been demonstrated for charisma by Antonakis et al. (2011).
Bass (1985) argued that charisma, or idealized influence, is a sub-
component of the broader construct of transformational leadership.
More recently other scholars have suggested the two constructs are
related but theoretically distinct (Antonakis et al., 2011; Antonakis,
2012; Yukl, 1999). Antonakis (2011; 2012), for instance, differentiates
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transformational leadership on the basis of leader influence grounded
in an empowering or developmental focus (e.g., individualized con-
sideration), and a “rational” influencing means (e.g., intellectual sti-
mulation). In any case, there seems to be agreement with regard to both
transformational leadership (Bass, 1985; Yukl, 1999) and charismatic
leadership (Antonakis et al., 2011) requiring an effect on followers,
rather than as constructs that are located within leaders themselves. In
contrast, overconfidence is located within the individual, and while we
do argue that overconfidence leads to positive attributions from (would
be) followers, the (aspiring) leader needs no audience to validate their
overconfidence. Overconfidence is an intrapsychic error in judgment,
which we argue manifests in positive attributions of leadership poten-
tial, but does not require these attributions to validate the construct.
Consequences of overconfidence
Selecting overconfident leaders may have detrimental consequences
for organizations. Overconfident CEOs might be more likely to over-
estimate their capabilities, performance, and chances of success, in-
creasing the likelihood of decision-making errors. For instance,
Malmendier and Tate's (2008) study of 394 large, publicly traded US
firms found that overconfident CEOs were 65% more likely to make
value-destroying decisions. Corporate failures, such as Enron, the Na-
tional Kidney Foundation, Parmalat, Global Crossing, Vivendi Uni-
versal, Tyco, and WorldCom, have been anecdotally linked to “man-
agerial hubris” (Hayward, 2007), or overconfidence mixed with
excessive pride (Judge et al., 2009). Another study that analyzed data
from publicly listed US banks between 1994 and 2009 reported that
overconfident CEOs were more likely to decrease lending standards and
to increase leverage in advance of a crisis, compared to other CEOs (Ho,
Huang, Lin, & Yen, 2016). As a result, these banks experienced more
loan defaults, larger drops in stock returns, and poorer operating per-
formance.
Decision making errors due to CEO overconfidence might also ex-
tend to the pursuit of riskier strategies that drive up stock return vo-
latility (Hirshleifer et al., 2012). For instance, Galasso and Simcoe
(2011) analyzed 290 publicly traded companies and 627 CEOs and
found that newly appointed overconfident CEOs were associated with a
25%–35% increase in citation-weighted patent counts. While under the
right market conditions this can increase innovation, under the wrong
conditions, or when conditions are overoptimistically appraised, it can
yield costly mistakes.
Overconfident CEOs are also more likely to ‘stick to their guns’, even
when those guns are pointed squarely at their own feet. For instance,
Ronay, Oostrom, Lehmann-Willenbrock, and Van Vugt (2017) con-
ducted four studies that demonstrated a positive relationship between
overconfidence and escalation of commitment in investment tasks.
Relatedly, Schrand and Zechman (2012) examined 49 firms that had
been identified by the SEC as having misstated the nature of their ac-
counts. A quarter of these firms were found to have committed outright
fraud, but for the remainder, executives' initial misstatements appear to
have simply reflected overestimation, which executives then felt com-
pelled to continue misreporting so as to not reveal their initial error.
Despite these scattered accounts of overconfident leaders there re-
mains little work on why leaders might be more likely to be over-
confident. Fast, Sivanathan, Mayer, and Galinsky (2012) showed that
the power and prestige that come with leadership provide a fertile
breeding ground for developing overconfidence. However, this evidence
and theorizing cannot account for the observed relationship between
overconfidence and emergent leadership (Reuben et al., 2012), nor for
the findings of Anderson et al. (2012) who report evidence for the status
enhancing utility of overconfidence. Thus, we suggest and test an ad-
ditional selection-based explanation: Overconfidence provides an ad-
vantage in leadership selection as it is appraised as accurately cali-
brated confidence.
Overconfidence and judgment accuracy
Brunswik's (1956) lens model offers a conceptual framework for
studying predictions of criteria that are probabilistically related to cues
(e.g., a recruiter's judgment of job candidates' potential on the basis of
their behavior). The accuracy of these predictions depends on two re-
lationships: the correlations between the cues and the underlying
construct (i.e., cue validity) and the correlations between the cues and
the inferences drawn by the observer (i.e., cue utilization). The accu-
racy of observers' judgment is a function of the extent to which cues
accurately reflect the underlying construct (cue validity), as well as to
what extent observers use these cues in their predictions (cue utiliza-
tion). A main advantage of grounding our work in Brunswik's lens
model is its ability to model judgment accuracy by taking into account
two processes: the cues that observers use to predict leadership po-
tential, and the relationships between these cues and candidates'
overconfidence levels.
Recently, Kausel, Culbertson, and Madrid (2016) investigated the
role of overconfidence in personnel selection utilizing the same model.
They demonstrated how a combination of standardized tests and un-
structured interviews (versus standardized tests alone) led recruiters to
be more overconfident (i.e., less accurate) in their predictions of can-
didates' future job success. Although candidates' overconfidence was
not the focus of Kausel et al. (2016), we expect that this unmeasured
variable played a role in distorting observers' estimations of candidates'
future job success. In the current paper we test such a possibility by
zooming out and surveying the relationship between cue utilization and
cue validity. Whereas Kausel et al. (2016) positioned the judgment
inaccuracy within the selection committee, we suggest a com-
plementary explanation that locates the origin of error within the
candidate. We build on previous theorizing by von Hippel and Trivers
(2011) who position overconfidence as a form of self-deception and not
merely conscious bluff or deceit, which can be observed or detected by
others (e.g., Vrij et al., 2000). Rather, we refer to overconfidence as a
self-deceptive belief that one is more skilled, intelligent, and capable than
one actually is (Epley & Whitchurch, 2008; Kruger & Dunning, 1999;
von Hippel & Trivers, 2011). This self-deceptive component is con-
sistent with conceptualizations of overconfidence as a “genuinely
flawed perception of one's own abilities” (Anderson et al., 2012; von
Hippel & Trivers, 2011). Thus, we theorize that due to a failure of self-
insight, overconfident candidates operate under the fulsome belief that
they are at least a little better than they actually are, resulting in falsely
inflated signals of their actual competence. This error of self-insight
leads observers to incorrectly infer a higher level of leadership potential
than is warranted. Fig. 1 shows the hypothesized false behavioral sig-
nals of overconfident candidates leading to lower cue validity and
therefore judgment inaccuracy.
Hypothesis 1. Candidates' overconfidence is positively associated with
perceptions of leadership potential.
Importantly, whereas perceptions of confidence are generally well
received, perceptions of overconfidence have been shown to meet with
disapproval (e.g., Colvin et al., 1995; Jones & Shrauger, 1970;
Schlenker & Leary, 1982; Tenney et al., 2008). However, as our model
locates the calibration error within the overconfident candidate, who is
by our reasoning unaware that their self-opinions are inflated, they do
not appear overconfident but merely confident, and so draw no such
disapproval. Thus, we expect that observers are unable to distinguish
the behavioral signals associated with overconfidence from behavioral
signals associated with confidence matched to competence.
Hypothesis 2. Candidates' overconfidence is positively associated with
perceptions of confidence and competence.
By presenting falsely inflated behavioral signals, the cue validities
for overconfident candidates are attenuated if not reversed (Fig. 1).
Thus, judgment accuracy is low, not because observers utilize the
wrong cues in their assessment of leadership potential, but because
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overconfidence signals desired leader traits (i.e., high confidence and
high competence), where it should signal overconfidence and low
competence. Indeed, Anderson et al. (2012) demonstrated that, in the
absence of information to the contrary, observers assume over-
confidence to reflect superior competence.
Hypothesis 3. Perceptions of confidence and competence mediate the
relationship between candidates' overconfidence and perceptions of
leadership potential.
Explanatory mechanisms
Explanations for the positive effects of overconfidence have focused
almost exclusively on intrapersonal hedonic benefits such as higher self-
esteem. Overly positive beliefs about oneself have been proposed to act
as an intrapsychic buffer against threats to self-esteem, serving to sus-
tain optimism, bolster happiness, enhance creativity, and drive goal
pursuit (e.g., Dunning et al., 1995; Taylor & Brown, 1988). These early
accounts and the empirical work that accompanied them clearly de-
monstrated that in general people are motivated toward overconfidence
and other self-serving illusions, such as optimism and illusions of con-
trol. However, whereas these accounts also positioned these self-en-
hancing illusions as arising from the need to maintain and/or maximize
self-esteem, recent work has raised the possibility that self-enhancing
illusions such as overconfidence may serve an interpersonal function, by
promoting behavioral signals that are read by others as confidence that
is backed by competence (Anderson et al., 2012; Murphy et al., 2015;
von Hippel & Trivers, 2011). Accordingly, overconfidence might pro-
vide social and professional benefits. We believe these social benefits
might be especially pronounced in the context of leadership selection.
What has not yet been explored is the possibility that these intra-
and interpersonal effects might be meaningfully related to one another.
Indeed, the intrapsychic benefits of overconfidence such as higher self-
esteem, positive affect in the face of social stressors, and a fulsome
belief in one's general prowess may facilitate the display of behavioral
signals that lead the overconfident to appear more confident and in
charge of their situations and circumstances. Leadership competitions
are psychologically stressful contexts, and while such stress can en-
hance performance up to a point, beyond this point people's perfor-
mance begins to suffer (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). For this reason,
overestimation of one's skills and abilities in response to the social
evaluative stressors of selection settings may serve to attenuate
distracting shifts in affect that may otherwise arise from self-doubt
(Hope, Gansler, & Heimberg, 1989; Rapee & Lim, 1992). Grounding our
theory within Brunswik's (1956) lens model, we describe the relation-
ship between the intrapersonal versus interpersonal utilities of over-
confidence by examining the mediating role of affective robustness in
the relationship between candidates' overconfidence and observers'
competence perceptions.
We define affective robustness as an individual difference that
makes some individuals less susceptible to affective changes in response
to stressful circumstances. The concept is similar to that of “resilience”
which appears more frequently in the literature (for a review see
Kaplan, 2002) but we reasoned that resilience (1) implies “bouncing
back” from stress rather than being less susceptible to stressors in the
first instance, and (2) resilience is confounded by conceptualizations
that define it as an outcome versus a cause or influence in the stress/
response relationship. We see affective robustness as an individually
located cause or influence that makes some individuals less susceptible
to affective stressors. As such, affective robustness is also akin to the
personality construct of “hardiness” (Kobasa, 1979), which comprises
three adaptive characteristics: commitment (belief in the importance
and value of oneself), control (the belief that life events are the con-
sequences of one's actions), and challenge (the belief that change is
positive rather than threatening). Despite the conceptual overlap,
hardiness is commonly measured through a single administration of a
trait-based questionnaire (e.g., Bartone, 2007), while affective robust-
ness is operationalized by a (lack of) change in affective states mea-
sured before and after a stressful event. We are interested in such
changes in affective states, as we believe that the overconfident are
relatively unaffected by stressors, which provides them an advantage in
the context of leadership selection.
Hypothesis 4. The positive relationship between overconfidence and
competence perceptions is mediated by affective robustness in response
to social stress.
The present research
We tested our predictions in five studies using a multi-method ap-
proach to triangulate on our central question: Are individual differences
in candidates' overconfidence predictive of leadership selection? We
address this question with a diverse range of data sources –
Fig. 1. Graphical representation of Brunswik's (1956) lens model applied to leadership selection contexts. Between parentheses are the hypothesized false behavioral
signals of overconfident candidates leading to lower cue validity and therefore judgment inaccuracy.
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organizational field, cross sectional political, experimental, laboratory,
and via an agent-based model. Study 1 was a field study wherein lea-
dership aspirants completed a measure of overconfidence before being
assessed by HR consultants for an advertised leadership position. Study
2 was a laboratory study that isolated the intra- and interpersonal uti-
lities of overconfidence, allowing us to test our hypothesized interplay
between them. Study 3 was an experiment in which we tested the effect
of confident behavioral signaling on leadership selection at different
levels of manipulated competence. Study 4 – a cross sectional study run
in the context of the 2016 US Primaries – examined the relationship
between respondents' voting intentions and their perceptions of can-
didates' confidence and competence. Finally, to illustrate possible so-
cietal effects of selection processes biased in favor of overconfident
leaders, Study 5 uses an agent-based simulation. It examines the longer-
term consequences of voters' preferences as in early 2016 (i.e., as ob-
served in Study 4) on presidential candidates' confidence signaling
strategies and the resulting election outcomes.
To measure overconfidence we employed an item-confidence
paradigm (Michailova, 2010) to target overprecision. Overprecision is
not only the most reliable way of operationalizing overconfidence
(Moore & Healy, 2008; Moore & Schatz, 2017; Moore & Swift, 2010)
but has also shown to be especially pervasive and resistant to debiasing
efforts (Harvey, 1997; Soll & Klayman, 2004). The paradigm asks a
series of general knowledge questions and for each provides three re-
sponse options from which participants can select the correct answer.
Participants are asked to indicate their confidence in the correctness of
their chosen response. Overconfidence is then derived from the degree
to which their confidence exceeds the accuracy of their responses. Ac-
cording to Michailova and Katter (2014), this instrument captures
overconfidence in its original psychological sense of miscalibration,
which mirrors the concept of overprecision as described by Moore and
Healy (2008). Therefore, throughout the current research we oper-
ationalize overconfidence as the difference between individuals' con-
fidence in their own knowledge and an objective measure of their ac-
tual knowledge.
Study 1
The goal of Study 1 was to test our core prediction – the positive
relationship between overconfidence and perceived leadership poten-
tial – in a field setting where the external validity of our findings would
be clearest. This context provided a strong test of our core hypothesis,
as both the consultants' appraisals and the candidates' performance
carried tangible potential costs and benefits.
Method
Participants were 76 assessment center candidates (44 male,
Mage = 35.53, SD = 7.90), who had applied for a leadership position
and were assessed by a large HR-consultancy in the Netherlands. This
was the complete sample of candidates who were interviewed for this
position during the 6 months of data collection. The majority of parti-
cipants were born in the Netherlands (57%) or Belgium (8%), and 51%
held a leadership position at the time of the assessment. The assessment
center program varied per participant, but all programs contained a
role-play, one or two interviews, a personality questionnaire, and a
cognitive ability test. Each participant was assessed by one consultant
(N = 12 in total; 3 male), who conducted the interview(s), and scored
the participant on the assessment center dimensions at the end of the
assessment day.
Study participation was voluntary. At the end of the assessment day,
but before the feedback session in which the consultant discussed his/
her observations with the participant, the consultant asked whether the
participant would be willing to fill out a general knowledge ques-
tionnaire (GKQ) for research purposes. The consultant stressed that
results would be treated confidentially, that he/she would not see the
test results, and that neither study participation nor the test results
would influence the assessment center outcome. After the feedback
session, the consultant filled out a short questionnaire to assess their
own estimation of the applicants' overconfidence. The competency
scores (i.e., scores on the assessment center dimensions) were retrieved
from the HR-consultancy's database after data collection was complete.
Overconfidence was operationalized as overprecision, or excessive
certainty in the correctness of one's knowledge (Moore & Healy, 2008;
Moore & Schatz, 2017; Moore & Swift, 2010) on an existing General
Knowledge Questionnaire (GKQ; Michailova, 2010). Previous research
has traditionally used confidence intervals to measure overprecision,
but this procedure has been shown problematic for two main reasons.
First, they require understanding of statistical notions with which even
well-educated people regularly make large errors (Cosmides & Tooby,
1996); and second, it consistently produces extreme overconfidence
levels (cf. Klayman, Soll, Gonzalez-Vallejo, & Barlas, 1999; Winman,
Hansson, & Juslin, 2004). The General Knowledge Questionnaire
overcomes these problems as the task is clearer to subjects, better re-
sembles how people experience and express confidence in daily life, and
is not inherently prone to elicit extreme levels of overconfidence
(Klayman et al., 1999; Michailova & Katter, 2014).
We used a previously adapted version (Ronay et al., 2017) of the
GKQ (Michailova, 2010: Michailova & Katter, 2014), taking the 18
items from Michailova's (2010) original measure (e.g., How many days
does a hen need to incubate an egg?) and adding six further items (Ronay
et al., 2017). Participants were instructed to choose the correct answer
from three alternatives (e.g., 21 days, 28 days, 14 days) and to provide a
number between 33% (chance) and 100% (absolute certainty) in-
dicating their confidence in the accuracy of that answer.1 Consistent
with previous work and as many scholars recommend,2 we computed
overconfidence by regressing participants' confidence scores (i.e., mean
confidence ratings) onto their accuracy (i.e., percentage of correctly
answered items) and saving the standardized residual scores (Anderson
et al., 2012; Cohen et al., 2003; Cronbach & Furby, 1970; DuBois, 1957;
John & Robins, 1994).3 This approach isolates the variance in partici-
pants' confidence while controlling for variance in accuracy (i.e., con-
fidence over and above accuracy) and correlates at 0.97 with a differ-
ence score (i.e., mean Mconfidence – Maccuracy).
Consultants' perceptions of applicants' overconfidence were mea-
sured subjectively by asking the consultants to rate the participants on
five items specifically developed for this study (e.g., “During the
1 To confirm that the GKQ indeed measures self-deceptive beliefs, we tested
among a sample of 127 students whether participants are capable of accurately
calibrating their confidence to their actual level of competence when in-
centivized to do so. To this end, we financially incentivized half of our parti-
cipants to accurately match their confidence estimations to their actual per-
formance, and we compared their overconfidence scores to a control group who
had received no financial incentive. If participants are self-deceptively unaware
of their overconfidence, they should be unable to accurately adjust their con-
fidence levels even when motivated to do so. Indeed, we found no difference in
overconfidence between the two groups, F(1,125) = 1.56, p = .21. These re-
sults are consistent with previous findings (Ehrlinger, Johnson, Banner,
Dunning, & Kruger, 2008; Hoelzl & Rustichini, 2005; Williams & Gilovich,
2008).
2 The use of difference scores has received widespread criticism as difference
scores are unreliable and tend to be confounded with variables that constitute
the index (e.g., Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003; Cronbach & Furby, 1970).
Scholars have suggested regressing participants' actual performance onto their
self-evaluations and retaining the residuals of the self-evaluations (e.g., John &
Robins, 1994).
3 Since it has been found that overconfidence is most evident in general
knowledge items of moderate or extreme difficulty (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, &
Phillips, 1982; Michailova, 2010; Moore & Healy, 2008), we calculated the
correlations between the mean score of the standardized residuals of items of
low (51–100% accuracy) and high difficulty (0–51% accuracy). The two scores
correlated 0.65, indicating that both type of items are measuring the same
construct.
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interview it became clear that the participant overestimates his/her job
performance.”). The consultants rated participants' overconfidence on a
5-point scale, with 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree.
Coefficient alpha of this scale was 0.92.
The recruitment agency had an established evaluation procedure in
which the consultants independently decided which assessment center
dimensions to use from a database of 104 different dimensions. To
distill this granular data into a more structured analytic framework, we
made an a priori decision to organize the consultants' competency
ratings around Bartram's (2005) Great Eight competency framework.
The Great Eight consists of the following competencies: Leading and
Deciding, Supporting and Cooperation, Interacting and Presenting, Ana-
lyzing and Interpreting, Creating and Conceptualizing, Organizing and Ex-
ecuting, Adapting and Coping, and Enterprising and Performing. Prior to
data gathering and analysis, each assessment center dimension was
independently coded by three authors of this paper as well as two re-
search assistants. Each coder ascribed one of the Great Eight compe-
tencies to each of the assessment center dimensions. If three or more
coders agreed, the assessment center dimension was classified accord-
ingly (ICC[3,1] for absolute agreement = 0.89). We were able to ca-
tegorize 85% of the dimensions used by the consulting firm according
to the Great Eight competency scheme.
Results
Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations
for the demographical variables, the two overconfidence measures, and
the Great Eight competencies.4 Consistent with Hypothesis 1 – candi-
dates' overconfidence will be positively associated with perceptions of
leadership potential – candidates' overconfidence (GKQ) was positively
related to evaluations on the dimension of Leading and Deciding
(r = 0.35, p < .01). Candidates' overconfidence (GKQ) was also posi-
tively related to Adapting and Coping (r = 0.47, p < .01).
Overconfidence as measured by the GKQ was unrelated to over-
confidence as assessed by the consultants (r = −0.03, p = .81). In other
words, there was no relationship between the consultants' perceptions
of how overconfident candidates were, and candidates' actual levels of
overconfidence. Of those job candidates who were classified as over-
confident based on their GKQ scores (n = 58), the consultants correctly
identified less than half (n = 23, 40%) as being overconfident (i.e.,
rated the overconfidence > 3). Of those job candidates who were
classified as underconfident based on their GKQ scores (n = 18), the
consultants believed more than half (n = 10, 56%) to be overconfident.
In contrast to candidates' actual overconfidence, consultants' percep-
tions of candidates' overconfidence were negatively correlated with
their average competency score (r = −0.28, p = .02).
Discussion
The results of Study 1 provide preliminary support for our central
Hypothesis 1. In contrast and consistent with previous reports
(Schlenker & Leary, 1982; Tenney et al., 2008), when overconfidence
was incorrectly inferred by consultants, it resulted in disapproval and
low assessment center ratings. Consistent with our conjectures, candi-
dates' overconfidence was unrelated to consultants' perceptions of can-
didates' overconfidence. These findings strongly support the view that
overconfidence is effective as a status-enhancing mechanism because it
appears indistinguishable from confidence (von Hippel & Trivers,
2011), apparently even to professional recruitment consultants. The
same cannot be said for observer attributions of overconfidence, as
these were negatively related to performance evaluations. Exactly what
cues were being used when consultants incorrectly inferred over-
confidence is not clear but distinguishing these from behavioral cues
associated with candidates' overconfidence is an important and inter-
esting avenue for future research. At a practical level, our results reveal
that consultants should be very careful in forming subjective evalua-
tions of participants' overconfidence. As these perceptions are un-
correlated with candidates' actual overconfidence levels, they may have
Table 1
Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations for Study 1.
N M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 314
1. Age 76 35.55 8.30
2. Gender 75 0.61 0.49 0.22
3. Nationality 76 0.43 0.50 −0.47⁎⁎ −0.43⁎⁎
4. Leadership position 76 0.51 0.50 0.05 −0.03 −0.16
5. Overconfidence (GKQ) 76 0.00 0.99 0.05 −0.10 0.07 0.13
6. Subjective
overconfidence
76 2.93 1.03 0.00 −0.04 −0.21 0.19 −0.03
7. Leading & deciding 57 57.29 12.81 0.17 −0.05 0.10 0.14 0.27⁎ 0.08
8. Supporting &
cooperating
44 57.86 18.63 −0.17 −0.04 0.05 −0.06 −0.10 −0.21 −0.32
9. Interacting & presenting 42 54.83 17.92 0.02 0.06 −0.19 −0.38⁎ 0.07 −0.31⁎ −0.13 0.32
10. Analyzing &
interpreting
22 73.08 22.94 −0.17 0.38 0.00 0.11 −0.05 −0.37 −0.24 0.08 0.26
11. Creating &
conceptualizing
17 66.39 22.87 −0.36 −0.39 0.39 0.21 0.31 −0.15 0.08 −0.16 0.11 -a
12. Organizing & executing 44 68.85 17.65 −0.26 0.06 0.22 −0.18 −0.33⁎ −0.15 −0.12 0.06 −0.01 0.05 -a
13. Adapting & coping 43 68.32 19.12 −0.06 −0.22 −0.08 0.40⁎⁎ 0.34⁎ 0.00 0.29 0.54⁎⁎ 0.33 −0.63 0.72⁎⁎ −0.09
14. Enterprising &
performing
49 70.45 16.94 −0.21 0.00 0.20 −0.14 0.11 −0.16 0.31 0.41⁎ 0.32 0.07 0.41 0.19 0.49⁎
15. Average competency
score
71 64.27 9.67 −0.16 −0.03 0.21 −0.18 0.05 −0.28⁎ 0.29⁎ 0.57⁎⁎ 0.61⁎⁎ 0.49⁎ 0.72⁎⁎ 0.45⁎⁎ 0.53⁎⁎ 0.70⁎⁎
Note. Gender was coded as 0 = female and 1 = male. Nationality is coded as 0 = Dutch and 1 = other. Leadership position is coded as 0 = no and 1 = yes.
Overconfidence is represented by the standardized residual score after regressing confidence scores onto their accuracy on the General Knowledge Questionnaire
(GKQ). Subjective overconfidence was measured on a 5-point scale and the competencies were measured on a scale from 0 to 100.
a None of the participants were rated on both of these competencies.
⁎ p < .05.
⁎⁎ p < .01.
4 We did not control for any of the demographics in our analyses. Age, gender,
and nationality were not significantly correlated with our study variables.
Leadership position correlated with Interacting and Presenting (r = −0.38,
p = .01) and Adapting and Coping (r = 0.40, p = .01). Controlling for leadership
position would not change our conclusions; only the correlation between the
GKQ and Adapting and Coping would become marginally significant (r = 0.30,
p = .06).
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detrimental effects on the validity and the utility of the assessment
center.
Study 2
The goal of Study 2 was to directly test the mechanisms identified in
our model (Fig. 1) and summarized in Hypothesis 4 – the positive re-
lationship between overconfidence and competence perceptions is
mediated by affective robustness in response to social stress. We ex-
pected that any such affective advantage would manifest most strongly
via non-verbal channels, as these channels are acutely sensitive to stress
(Makatsori et al., 2004) and the most difficult to intentionally conceal
from attentive observers (Ekman & Friesen, 1969, 1974).
Our second question concerned the extent to which overconfidence
as measured by the GKQ generalizes to overconfidence in one's social
prowess and presentation skills within the context of leadership con-
tests. If one's inflated self-image is domain specific, in this case limited
to knowledge of obscure facts, then it should have little bearing on how
confident people appear when competing for leadership roles. On the
other hand, if such overconfidence is domain-independent and reflects
a generally enhanced self-image, then this might lead one to appear
more confident, and therefore competent in the eyes of a leadership
selection panel. To determine whether overconfidence in one's own
general knowledge generalizes to our context of interest, we asked
participants to rate the quality of their own presentations on the same
assessment center criteria addressed by the panel, and we compared
these to GKQ scores as well as a panel's ratings.
Method
Participants were 140 students (23 male; Mage = 20.02, SD = 1.89)
at a large Dutch university who were asked to deliver a simulated job
talk in front of a live committee, a reliable inducer of stress
(Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer, 1993). To provide a baseline for
affect, participants first completed the Positive and Negative Affect
Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), prior to learning they
would have to deliver a job talk. We again used the GKQ to assess
overconfidence. Participants were then given 10 min to prepare a 5 min
presentation, intended to convince a committee (consisting of two
trained research assistants who were blind to our hypotheses) that they
were the best candidate for a hypothetical leadership position. Pre-
sentations were video recorded and rated by the panel in terms of their
verbal and non-verbal quality. To assess change in affect in response to
the social stressor, participants again completed the PANAS (a fre-
quently used measure of mood stability/change in the context of social
evaluative stressors; for a review see Allen, Kennedy, Cryan, Dinan, &
Clarke, 2014) immediately following the presentation. Finally, partici-
pants were asked to evaluate the quality of their own presentations on
the same criteria used by the panel.
Overconfidence was measured using the same questionnaire, con-
fidence estimations, and residualized approach as in Study 1. We used
the PANAS (Watson et al., 1988), which consists of 10 positive
(α = 0.82 at T0 and α = 0.87 at T1) and 10 negative (α = 0.86 at T0
and T1) emotion terms on which participants indicate their present
affective experience on a 5-point scale anchored by 1 = very slightly or
not at all and 5 = extremely.
Presentations were evaluated according to 12 criteria (α = 0.90 for
other ratings and α = 0.91 for self-ratings), of which 6 related to the
verbal quality of the presentation (structure, speech, understandability,
main points, voice, and persuasion; α = 0.87 for other-ratings; α = 0.86
for self-ratings) and 6 to the non-verbal quality of the presentation (eye
contact, posture, gestures, use of space, calm, and enthusiasm; α = 0.83
for both other-ratings and self-ratings). The participants and the two
observers rated the criteria on a 5-point scale, with 1 = weak perfor-
mance and 5 = strong performance. Observer ratings were averaged for
each dimension; the average ICC (Hollander, 1958) for consistency was
0.74. The average correlation between the self-ratings and the other
ratings was 0.22.
Results
Table 2 provides the bivariate correlations between overconfidence
and the six verbal and six nonverbal criteria. Regressing the overall
score (mean of all 12 criteria) onto overconfidence revealed no re-
lationship, b = 0.07, 95%CI[−0.02, 0.16], t(138) = 1.52, p = .13,
d = 0.26. When we independently regressed our verbal and non-verbal
composite variables onto overconfidence, we observed no relationship
with verbal quality, b = 0.02, 95%CI[−0.07, 0.11], t(138) =0.44,
p = .66, d = 0.07, and as expected, we observed a positive relationship
with the non-verbal quality of the presentations, b=0.12, 95%CI[0.01,
0.22], t(138) = 2.22, p = .03, d= 0.38.
Participants experienced significant decreases in positive affect,
M = 3.09, SD = 0.57 at T0 and M = 2.83, SD = 0.73 at T1, F
(1,139) = 30.61, p < .01, d= 0.94, and significant increases in ne-
gative affect, M = 1.36, SD = 0.46 at T0 and M = 1.50, SD = 0.53 at
T1, F(1,139) = 10.22, p < .01, d= 0.54, following their presentations.
We then regressed positive affect measured after the presentation onto
overconfidence while controlling for positive affect measured before
the presentation and both time-point measures of negative affect. This
revealed a positive relationship between overconfidence and change in
Table 2
Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations for Study 2.
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. Overconfidence 0.00 1.00
2. Eye contactNV 4.04 0.84 0.18⁎
3. PostureNV 3.57 0.75 0.06 0.23⁎⁎
4. GesturesNV 3.18 1.07 0.17⁎ 0.33⁎⁎ 0.68⁎⁎
5. Use of spaceNV 2.80 0.61 0.21⁎ 0.21⁎ 0.54⁎⁎ 0.67⁎⁎
6. CalmnessNV 3.18 0.77 0.08 0.41⁎⁎ 0.41⁎⁎ 0.46⁎⁎ 0.34⁎⁎
7. Structure 3.54 0.81 0.04 0.31⁎⁎ 0.34⁎⁎ 0.43⁎⁎ 0.30⁎⁎ 0.53⁎⁎
8. Speech 3.77 0.71 0.04 0.45⁎⁎ 0.32⁎⁎ 0.37⁎⁎ 0.27⁎⁎ 0.63⁎⁎ 0.62⁎⁎
9. Understandability 3.99 0.52 0.03 0.40⁎⁎ 0.26⁎⁎ 0.28⁎⁎ 0.17⁎ 0.47⁎⁎ 0.57⁎⁎ 0.64⁎⁎
10. Main points 3.59 0.62 0.02 0.14 0.31⁎⁎ 0.35⁎⁎ 0.23⁎⁎ 0.30⁎⁎ 0.61⁎⁎ 0.38⁎⁎ 0.46⁎⁎
11. EnthusiasmNV 3.26 0.89 0.14 0.22⁎⁎ 0.60⁎⁎ 0.70⁎⁎ 0.63⁎⁎ 0.47⁎⁎ 0.50⁎⁎ 0.44⁎⁎ 0.29⁎⁎ 0.30⁎⁎
12. Voice 3.93 0.48 −0.05 0.26⁎⁎ 0.17⁎ 0.14 0.13 0.52⁎⁎ 0.30⁎⁎ 0.52⁎⁎ 0.45⁎⁎ 0.21⁎ 0.22⁎
13. Persuasion 3.30 0.96 0.08 0.34⁎⁎ 0.45⁎⁎ 0.58⁎⁎ 0.46⁎⁎ 0.64 0.78⁎⁎ 0.65⁎⁎ 0.59⁎⁎ 0.65⁎⁎ 0.62⁎⁎ 0.37⁎⁎
Note. Overconfidence is represented by the standardized residual score after regressing confidence scores onto accuracy on the General Knowledge Questionnaire
(GKQ). The AC criteria are all measured on a 5-point scale. N = 140.
NV=Nonverbal dimensions.
⁎ p < .05.
⁎⁎ p < .01.
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positive affect, b = 0.09, 95%CI[0.00, 0.18], t(135) = 2.00, p = .05,
d = 0.34, d = 0.31. Note that this result reveals that whereas we ob-
served a main effect for a decline in positive affect, overconfident
participants were more likely to maintain their initial level of positivity
in the face of the social stressor. When we employed the same strategy
for T1 negative affect, no relationship with overconfidence emerged,
b = 0.04, 95%CI[−0.04, 0.12], t(135) = 0.90, p = .37, d = 0.15.
We next turned to Hypothesis 4 – the positive relationship between
overconfidence and competence perceptions is mediated by affective
robustness in response to social stress. We used Model 4 of the PRO-
CESS Macro (Hayes, 2016) and entered non-verbal quality as the de-
pendent variable, overconfidence as the independent variable, positive
affect at T1 as the mediator. Positive and negative affect at T0 as well as
T1 negative affect and verbal presentation quality were entered as
covariates. Consistent with our hypothesis, this bootstrapping proce-
dure with 10,000 resamples revealed an indirect effect (IE) via T1 po-
sitive affect IE = 0.02, SE = 0.01, 95%CI = [0.00, 0.06]. However, this
result should be interpreted with caution as it is likely to be biased by
endogeneity.
We conducted a robustness check to examine whether endogeneity
issues might be biasing our results, because our mediator (T1 positive
affect) and dependent variable (non-verbal presentation quality) may
share unmodeled common causes. To that end, we estimated an in-
strumental variable model using a two-stage least squares estimator
(Shaver, 2005; see also Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 2010).
Specifically, we used the “ivregress” command in STATA/IC 15.1 for
Mac (with the “2sls” estimator) with non-verbal presentation quality as
the dependent variable, T1 positive affect as an endogenous mediator,
individual differences in overconfidence as our exogenous instrument,
and verbal presentation quality, T0 positive affect, as well as T0 ne-
gative affect and T1 negative affect as control variables. Over-
confidence scores serve as an appropriate exogenous instrument be-
cause the scores are probably fixed and unlikely to be a function of the
other predictors in the model (i.e., a predetermined preference of the
subject). This revealed a marginal effect for our instrumented mediator
positive affect, b = 1.09, p = .06. However, the first stage of the 2SLS
procedure, in which TI positive affect was regressed onto the exogenous
instrument returned an F-statistic of 3.85, p = .05. This value is very
low (lower than critical values indicating about 30% of bias) and thus
indicates our available instrument is very weak. Also, we tested for the
exogeneity of our mediator. Results for the Durbin test (χ2(1) = 3.91,
p = .05) and Wu-Hausman test (F(1,133) = 3.82, p = .05) along with
our weak instruments clearly indicate that our mediator is endogenous.
With such a weak instrument the Hausman test will be rather under-
powered even invalid (Hahn, Ham, & Moon, 2011). This problem is
exacerbated by a very small sample size (Hausman, Stock & Yogo,
2005). As a result of this procedure, and because the OLS and instru-
mental variable (IV) results are quite different, one must be very cau-
tious in interpreting our PROCESS mediation results.
Given that the instrument is weak, we decided to employ a max-
imum likelihood approach, which is better suited for, and more efficient
with weak instruments. We estimated a SEM model with correlated
disturbances for both endogenous variables (i.e., positive affect and
non-verbal quality). This specification revealed again a marginal effect
of positive affect on nonverbal presentation quality b = 1.09, p = .06,
and a small but significant effect of overconfidence on positive affect,
b = 0.09, p = .05. The instrumented indirect effect was significant,
IE = 0.10, p = .01, lending support for our Hypothesis 4. Note that
given our model was just-identified (i.e., we had one excluded instru-
ment for endogenous predictor), we were not able to test for the validity
of the constraint made, that is, whether overconfidence scores only
affected non-verbal presentation quality through its effect on positive
affect (i.e., the exclusion restriction). Theoretically, nonetheless, we
suggest that the effect of overconfidence on non-verbal presentation
quality emerges solely as a function of affective robustness in the
context of social stress, as overly positive beliefs about oneself have
been described as providing intrapsychic buffer against threats to self-
esteem, which are characteristically induced by social stress (e.g.,
Dunning et al., 1995; Taylor & Brown, 1988).
Regressing overall self-evaluation of presentation quality onto GKQ
scores also revealed a significant positive relationship, b = 0.19, 95%CI
[0.07,. 31], t(138) = 3.12, p < .01, d = 0.53, and this relationship
remained significant when we controlled for panel evaluations,
b = 0.12, 95%CI[0.04, 0.21], t(137) = 2.83, p < .01, d = 0.48.
Contrasting participants' mean self-evaluations (M = 2.69, SD = 0.72)
with the panel's evaluation (M= 3.51, SD = 0.53) revealed partici-
pants to be far harsher critics of their own performance than were the
panel members, F(1,139) = 347.03, p < .001, d = 1.30. Consistent
with expectations, entering GKQ scores as a covariate in this analysis
revealed an interaction, F(1,138) = 7.44, p < .01, d = 0.46, such that
overconfidence was associated with less self-criticism, correlating at
r = 0.23, p = .007 with the difference between self and panel evalua-
tions (i.e., self-ratings – panel ratings).
We next looked at the self-rated subcategories for the verbal and
non-verbal quality of presentations. GKQ scores positively predicted
self-evaluations of verbal presentation quality, b = 0.20, 95%CI[0.07,
0.32], t(138) = 3.15, p < .01, d= 0.54, remaining significant when
we controlled for the panel's evaluations, b = 0.18, 95%CI[0.08, 0.29],
t(137) = 3.49, p < .01, d = 0.60. GKQ scores also predicted non-
verbal presentation quality, b = 0.17, 95%CI[0.05, 0.30], t
(138) = 2.76, p < .01, d = 0.47, although this effect was no longer
significant after controlling for panel evaluations, b = 0.08, 95%CI
[−0.02, 0.17], t(137) = 1.66, p = .10, d = 0.28. We also observed
greater variance between self/other ratings on the verbal dimension
(M = −1.06, SD = 0.65) than the non-verbal dimension (M= −0.59,
SD = 0.56), t(139) = −9.31, p < .001), leaving less variance to be
explained on the non-verbal dimension.
Discussion
Consistent with Hypothesis 4, people's psychological experience of
social stress was buffered by higher levels of overconfidence and this
psychological buffering mediated the positive relationship between
overconfidence and the panel's appraisals of participants' competence.
This pattern of relationships supports our conceptual model (Fig. 1) and
demonstrates the functional relationship between the intra- and inter-
personal effects of overconfidence. However, we acknowledge that the
results of our OLS analysis cannot be trusted, given that the regressor is
endogenous. Further, the weakness of our available instrument makes
our IV approach less than ideal (albeit better than OLS). Future re-
plications using stronger instruments and experimental designs may
help rule out endogeneity concerns.
Our second question concerned the extent to which overconfidence
in one's general knowledge (i.e., GKQ scores) would generalize to
overconfidence in one's social prowess and presentation skills. We saw a
consistent and positive relationship between overconfidence as mea-
sured by the GKQ and people's self-evaluations. Importantly, these ef-
fects held when we controlled for the panel's evaluations, with the
exception of the non-verbal evaluations, where reduced variance be-
tween self and other ratings may have limited our power to detect the
effect. It is of interest, however, that participants in this study generally
underestimated the quality of their presentations relative to the panel's
ratings. This finding was in contrast to their overestimation of accuracy
on the GKQ. Although the relative degree to which participants self-
enhanced remained more or less consistent, the absolute degree to
which they self-enhanced was lowered when they were under the
scrutiny of a selection panel. In other words, participants, in general,
underestimated the quality of their presentations compared to the panel
ratings of their presentations, however, this generalized under-
estimation was attenuated by individual differences in overconfidence,
as measured by the GKQ. We suggest that this generalized under-
estimation was due to the public versus private contexts in which these
self-assessments were made. If overconfidence is socially motivated and
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functional, as we suggest it is, and if inferred overconfidence results in
negative social outcomes, then the expression of overconfidence should
be sensitive to social scrutiny. This reasoning is consistent with both
laboratory findings (e.g., Hughes & Beer, 2012; Ronay et al., 2017), and
observed cultural differences in the expression of self-enhancement
(Yates, Lee, & Bush, 1997), which emerge despite the cross-cultural
consistency of self-enhancing cognitions (Sedikides, Gaertner, &
Toguchi, 2003). See also Brown (2010), Sedikides and Alicke (2012),
and Sedikides and Gregg (2008) for a discussion regarding the uni-
versality of self-enhancement.
It is worth noting that the calibration of overconfidence in the
context of social evaluative scrutiny sparks deeper questions regarding
the level at which people might be engaging in self-deception. If peo-
ple's overconfidence stems from self-deception, as we argue it must do
in order to be interpersonally effective, then how are expressions of
overconfidence sensitive to social scrutiny? Readers interested in ex-
ploring this profoundly fundamental question should perhaps start with
von Hippel and Trivers' (2011) original article before moving on to the
commentaries and responses that accompanied that publication. In
particular, Lu and Chang (2011) describe how the interpersonal ‘arms
race’ between deception and deception detection necessitates that self-
deception must respond to social conditions registering detection-
varying problems. von Hippel and Trivers (2011) also dedicate a large
section of their response to describing “plausibility constraints” and
mechanisms that are necessary for self-deception to effectively facilitate
what they argue is its ultimate goal of other-deception. They highlight
that the calibration of self-deception, in the service of plausibility, need
not be operating at a consciously accessible level, “we certainly believe
that self-deception is intentional, in the sense that the organism itself
intends to produce the bias, although the intention could be entirely
unconscious” (von Hippel & Trivers, 2011, p. 42).
A limitation of Study 2 is that the panel could only indirectly infer
competence from targets' behavioral displays during the job talk, whereas
in actual selection contexts, assessors have additional objective cues of
competence. A resume, which provides a clear indication of the applicant's
competence through past accomplishments, is part of nearly every selec-
tion procedure (Zibarras & Woods, 2010). With competence known, it is
presumably easier to distinguish between confidence and overconfidence,
and so behavioral displays of confidence might be less effective and more
likely to draw censure when one's self-aggrandizing bluff and bluster is
accompanied by contrary evidence. On the other hand, strong signals of
confidence may always be seen as potential, winning status and leadership
support even when recognized as overconfidence (Kennedy et al., 2013).
We will therefore test whether the positive effects of overconfidence in
leadership selection will remain when assessors possess clear information
regarding the candidates' competence.
Study 3
In Study 3 we employed an experimental design that would allow us
to simultaneously address Hypotheses 1–3. Our key question concerned
whether candidates' overconfidence would be positively associated
with perceptions of leadership potential even when candidates' com-
petence is known to be low. As per Hypothesis 2, we also expected that
observers would read the behavioral signals associated with candidates'
overconfidence as denoting confidence and competence, but not over-
confidence. And as per Hypotheses 1 and 3, we expected that these
perceptions of confidence and competence would mediate the positive
relationship between overconfidence and leadership potential.
To test our hypotheses, we took the first thirty second slice of each
of the videos recorded in Study 2, we removed the audio, and we paired
each video with cues of both high and low competence (manipulated by
an accompanying resume). We saw this as a strong test of the strength
of (over)confident signaling – we ask people to infer leadership suit-
ability from half a minute of silent behavior and we expected these
assessments to be predicted by targets' overconfidence on a general
knowledge test. Previous studies have indeed shown that such thin
slices of behavior provide accurate assessments of a wide variety of
traits (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992).
Method
Targets were taken from the 140 students who participated in Study
2, whose overconfidence we had already captured by means of the
GKQ. We excluded ten clips due to either redundant overconfidence
scores5 (n = 3) or poor image quality (n = 7). We then extracted the
first 30s slice from each of the remaining videos (each job talk as vi-
deotaped in Study 2 was 5 min long). Finally, we removed the sound
from all clips so that participants' only source of information was the
targets' non-verbal behaviors.
The 30 s videos were then pretested to confirm that targets' over-
confidence (i.e., GKQ scores) were positively related to raters' percep-
tions of targets' confidence. A total of 306 MTurk workers (56% men,
Mage = 37.77, SD = 12.52, ranging from 17 to 79) each watched a
randomly selected set of five clips and assessed each targets' level of
confidence. We aimed to have each target rated at least 10 times
(M = 12, SD = 1.45) but due to randomization 10 clips failed to meet
this target and were therefore excluded. Regressing raters' perceptions
of targets' confidence onto targets' actual level of overconfidence (i.e.,
GKQ scores) revealed the expected positive relationship, b = 0.20,
95%CI[0.03,0.37], t(118) = 2.35, p = .02, d = 0.43. The final set of
targets was therefore composed of these 120 remaining clips/targets,
which were then crossed with our manipulation of competence.
To manipulate targets' competence we created four fake resumes
aimed to cue either high or low competence. Another pre-test pilot
study, in which 50 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers (60% men,
Mage = 31.67, SD = 7.53) rated all four CVs on perceived competence
revealed that the two intended high competence resumes were per-
ceived to display significantly higher competence (M = 5.24,
SD = 1.15; M = 5.34, SD = 1.19) than the two intended low compe-
tence resumes (M = 3.90, SD = 1.40; M = 4.00, SD = 1.40), all
p < .001. Further analyses also showed that both the two high, t
(98) = −0.35, p = .72, d= −0.07, and the two low, t(98) = −0.42,
p = .67, d= −0.08, competence resumes did not significantly differ
from each other. We then crossed each of the resumes with every video
slice for a total of 240 overconfidence-competence combinations – half
of those representing our high competence condition and the other half
our low competence condition. These 240 combinations were rated by
725 MTurk workers (52% men, Mage = 35.96, SD = 11.45, ranging
from 18 to 74). Each overconfidence-competence combination was as-
sessed for competence, confidence, overconfidence, and leadership
suitability by an average of 10.76 (SD = 1.54) independent raters, re-
sulting in a total of 2584 ratings.
We told participants that clips were filmed in the context of a uni-
versity course aimed to train postgraduate students for their upcoming
job seeking process. At the end of the course, students had to hand in
their resume and give a talk in front of a selection panel that would then
decide which candidates to hire for a hypothetical leadership position.
The participants' goal was to help in this decision by offering their own
perceptions of several randomly presented candidates. To this end, we
also showed them a brief description of the ostensible leadership po-
sition, which included a list of the most important tasks of the potential
leaders. These tasks were inspired by and intended to resemble those of
5 Three of the targets happened to have the exact same GKQ score as three
other targets. Including all six of them would have resulted in having three
levels of overconfidence represented twice in our sample. This was incon-
venient for at least two reasons. First, those were the only levels of over-
confidence represented by more than one student, causing unnecessary im-
balance. Second, including all six students in the study would not add any new
information relative to including only three of them. We thus decided to ran-
domly pick three of those six students and exclude the other three from our pool
of targets.
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real management job offers in different professional online networks
such a LinkedIn or InfoJobs.
Following each video, participants responded to several questions.
To assess perceptions of overconfidence raters responded to the ques-
tion, “How overconfident is this candidate?” on a 7-point scale, with
1 = extremely underconfident and 7 = extremely overconfident. To assess
perceptions of confidence raters responded to the question, “How much
confidence does this candidate have?” on a 7-point scale, with 1 = ex-
tremely low confidence and 7 = extremely high confidence. To assess
perceptions of competence raters responded to the question, “How much
competence does this candidate have?” on a 7-point scale, with 1 = ex-
tremely low competence and 7 = extremely high competence. To measure
leadership suitability, participants responded to four questions adopted
from Cole, Rubin, Field, and Giles (2007), “How likely is it that you would
be interested in interviewing this candidate?”, “How likely is it that you
would recommend this candidate be hired?”, “If hired for the theoretical
position, how likely is it that this candidate would succeed in the job?”,
“Taking everything into consideration regarding the applicant's interview
extract and cv, what is your overall evaluation of this candidate?”, plus one
question regarding the target's leadership potential, “How much poten-
tial does this candidate have as a leader?”. These five items constituted a
reliable scale in both the high (α = 0.97) and low (α = 0.97) compe-
tence condition. Responses were given on a 6-point scale, with 1 = very
unlikely/negative and 6 = very likely/positive. ICC (3,1) for absolute
agreement = 0.86 based on mean ratings (k = 658).
Results
Table 3 provides the bivariate correlations between candidates' age,
gender, overconfidence and the respondents' ratings in the two com-
petence conditions.6 To examine the effect of manipulated competence
(i.e., resume) on leadership suitability, we contrasted suitability scores
in the high, M = 4.92, SD = 0.40, and low, M = 3.58, SD = 0.47,
competence conditions, t(119) = 31.35, p < .001, d = 5.75.
To examine the main effect of targets' overconfidence on leadership
suitability (Hypothesis 1) we regressed leadership suitability scores (ag-
gregating across the two conditions for our main effect test) onto targets'
GKQ scores. This revealed a positive relationship between targets' over-
confidence and ratings of their leadership suitability, b= 0.07, SE= 0.03,
95%CI[0.00,0.14], t(118) = 2.10, p= .04, d= 0.39.
To examine whether this effect of targets' overconfidence on lea-
dership suitability was moderated by manipulated competence we used
the repeated measures approach in GLM, fitting suitability ratings from
the high and low competence conditions as the repeated factor, and
GKQ scores as a covariate. This revealed no interaction between targets'
overconfidence and manipulated competence in perceptions of leader-
ship suitability, F(1,118) = 0.63, p = .43. Overconfidence was posi-
tively related to suitability scores in both the high competence condi-
tion, b = 0.07, SE = 0.04, 95%CI[0.00,0.14], t(118) = 1.98, p = .05,
d = 0.36, and the low competence condition, b = 0.11, SE = 0.04,
95%CI[0.02,0.19], t(118) = 2.52, p = .01, d = 0.46.
Perceived confidence was greater in the high competence condition,
M = 5.00, SD = 0.70, compared to the low competence condition,
M = 4.42, SD = 0.75, t(119) = 11.10, p < .001, d = 2.04. Consistent
with Hypothesis 2, regressing perceived confidence onto targets' over-
confidence scores revealed a positive main effect, b = 0.15, SE = 0.06,
95%CI[0.03,0.27], t(118) = 2.50, p = .01, d = 0.46. We observed no
interaction between targets' overconfidence and manipulated compe-
tence in perceptions of confidence, F(1,118) = 2.29, p = .13. Over-
confidence was positively related to perceived confidence in the high
competence condition, b = 0.20, SE = 0.06, 95%CI[0.08,0.32], t
(118) = 3.21, p < .01, d= 0.59, and marginally related to perceived
confidence in the low competence condition, b = 0.12, SE = 0.07,
95%CI[−0.07,0.26], t(118) = 1.73, p = .09, d = 0.32.
Perceived competence was greater in the high competence condi-
tion, M = 5.53, SD = 0.41, than the low competence condition,
M = 4,13, SD = 0.45, t(119) = 29.12, p < .001, d = 5.34. Consistent
with Hypothesis 2, regressing perceived competence onto targets'
overconfidence scores revealed a marginally significant positive re-
lationship, b = 0.06, SE = 0.03, 95%CI[0.00,0.13], t(118) = 1.97,
p = .05, d= 0.36. We observed no interaction between targets' over-
confidence and manipulated competence in perceptions of competence,
F(1,118) = 2.47, p = .12. Overconfidence had no relationship with
perceived competence in the high competence condition, b = 0.04,
SE = 0.04, 95%CI[−0.03,0.12], t(118) = 1.15, p = .25, d = 0.21, and
we observed a significant positive relationship in the low competence
condition, b = 0.12, SE = 0.04, 95%CI[0.04,0.20], t(118) = 2.92,
p < .01, d = 0.54.7
Table 3
Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations for Study 3.
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Age 20.03 1.97
2. Gender 0.18 0.38 0.18⁎
3. GKQ 0.01 1.02 0.24⁎⁎ 0.11
Low competence condition
4. Perceived overconfidence 3.56 0.59 0.02 0.01 0.18
5. Perceived confidence 4.42 0.75 0.02 −0.06 0.16 0.80⁎⁎
6. Perceived competence 4.13 0.45 0.15 −0.14 0.26⁎⁎ 0.27⁎⁎ 0.53⁎⁎
7. Leadership suitability 3.58 0.47 0.09 −0.19⁎ 0.22⁎ 0.42⁎⁎ 0.67⁎⁎ 0.83⁎⁎
High competence condition
8. Perceived overconfidence 3.76 0.55 0.04 −0.01 0.19⁎ 0.60⁎⁎ 0.54⁎⁎ 0.23⁎ 0.36⁎⁎
9. Perceived confidence 5.00 0.70 0.08 −0.08 0.28⁎⁎ 0.62⁎⁎ 0.69⁎⁎ 0.33⁎⁎ 0.50⁎⁎ 0.81⁎⁎
10. Perceived competence 5.53 0.41 0.06 −0.16 0.10 0.10 0.28⁎⁎ 0.25⁎⁎ 0.29⁎⁎ 0.25⁎⁎ 0.53⁎⁎
11. Leadership suitability 4.92 0.40 0.11 −0.14 0.18 0.25⁎⁎ 0.42⁎⁎ 0.34⁎⁎ 0.43⁎⁎ 0.40⁎⁎ 0.68⁎⁎ 0.83⁎⁎
Note. As the candidate is the focus of the analyses, age, gender and GKQ scores are those of the candidates (N = 120). Gender was coded as 0 = female and 1 = male.
Overconfidence is represented by the standardized residual score after regressing confidence scores onto accuracy on the General Knowledge Questionnaire (GKQ).
Perceptions of overconfidence, confidence, competence, and leadership suitability are all measured on a 7-point scale.
⁎ p < .05.
⁎⁎ p < .01.
6 We did not control for any of the demographics in our analyses. Age was not
significantly correlated with our study variables. Gender correlated with the
leadership suitability ratings in the low competence condition (r = −0.19,
p = .04). Controlling for gender does not change our conclusions.
7 Note that the non-significant interaction reveals that the difference between
these simple slopes is not significant but does not preclude the possibility of
both significant and non-significant slopes across conditions.
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Perceived overconfidence was greater in the high competence
condition, M = 3.76, SD = 0.55, than the low competence condition,
M = 3.56, SD = 0.59, t(119) = 4.27, p < .001, d = 0.78. When we
regressed participants' perceptions of overconfidence onto targets'
overconfidence scores we observed an unexpected positive relationship,
b = 0.10, SE = 0.05, 95%CI[0.01,0.19], t(118) = 2.10, p = .04,
d = 0.39. We observed no interaction between targets' overconfidence
and manipulated competence in perceptions of overconfidence, F
(1,118) = 0.01, p = .93. Overconfidence had a positive relationship
with perceived overconfidence in the high competence condition,
b = 0.11, SE = 0.05, 95%CI[0.01,0.21], t(118) = 2.12, p = .04,
d = 0.39, and a marginal positive effect in the low competence condi-
tion, b = 0.10, SE = 0.05, 95%CI[−0.00,0.21], t(118) = 1.91, p = .06,
d = 0.35.
We next turned to Hypothesis 3 and examined the indirect pathways
via which targets' GKQ scores were related to our primary dependent
variable of leadership suitability. To do so we used Model 4 of PROCESS
(Hayes, 2016), fitting GKQ scores as the independent variable, our
aggregated leadership suitability measure as the dependent variable,
and perceptions of confidence, competence, and overconfidence si-
multaneously fitted as potential mediators. As expected we observed
indirect effects via perceived confidence, IE = 0.04, SE =. 02, 95%CI
[0.01,0.07], and perceived competence, IE = 0.04, SE = 0.19 95%CI
[0.01,0.08], though not via perceived overconfidence, IE = −0.01,
SE = 0.01, 95%CI[−0.03,0.00]. To explore the possibility of moder-
ated mediation, we examined whether these effects were robust to our
manipulation of competence. In the low competence condition we again
observed indirect effects via confidence, IE = 0.03, SE = 0.02, 95%CI
[0.00,0.07], and competence, IE = 0.08, SE = 0.03, 95%CI[0.03,0.13],
though again not via overconfidence, IE = −0.00, SE = 0.01, 95%CI
[−0.03,0.01]. In the high competence condition we yet again observed
indirect effects via perceptions of confidence, IE = 0.05 SE = 0.02,
95%CI[0.02,0.08], though here neither for competence, IE = 0.03,
SE = 0.02, 95%CI[−0.02,0.07], nor overconfidence, IE = −0.01,
SE = 0.01, 95%CI[−0.03,0.00]. However, as in Study 2, these results
must be interpreted with caution as they too are likely to be biased by
endogenous mediators.
Again, we conducted a robustness check to inspect whether en-
dogeneity issues might be biasing our results. Through this endogeneity
testing, we controlled for a potential inflation of our results due to a
common-source bias that could have occurred as the mediating vari-
ables (i.e., perceived confidence and perceived competence) and the
dependent variable (i.e., leadership suitability) were measured from the
same source. Other omitted variables may also threaten the unbiased-
ness and consistency of our estimates.
Using a similar procedure to that in Study 2, we estimated an in-
strumental variable specification. Our endogenous mediators are per-
ceived competence and perceived confidence; to instrument these
variables, we used sex (theoretically correlated with perceived com-
petence) and individual differences in overconfidence (theoretically
correlated with perceived confidence and weakly with competence).
We estimated a SEM model with correlated disturbances for all en-
dogenous variables in the model (i.e., the two mediators, perceptions of
confidence and competence, and the dependent variable, leadership
suitability). We first tested the strength of our instruments. Both ex-
cluded instruments were weak in the perceived confidence (F-test
equivalent: 3.90) and perceived competence (F-test equivalent: 5.12)
equations. These F-values unfortunately fall well below conventional
standards for IV estimation (F-values larger than 10, see Stock & Yogo,
2005). This result suggests that both target sex and individual differ-
ences in target overconfidence are weak instruments, and so IV esti-
mates will also be biased. These results also suggest that the PROCESS
result will definitely be biased and untrustworthy. We tentatively report
the results of our IV mediation analyses; however, these results have to
be interpreted with caution. In the first stage, we observed significant
paths from both measured overconfidence, b = 0.07, p = .02, and sex,
b = 0.10, p = .01, to perceived competence. Measured overconfidence
was also a significant predictor of perceived confidence, b = 0.16,
p = .01, whereas sex was not significantly related to perceptions of
confidence, b = 0.09, p = .24. In the second stage, we observed a sig-
nificant effect for perceived competence on leadership suitability,
b = 1.02, p = .01, though the relationship between perceived con-
fidence and leadership suitability was non-significant, b = 0.05,
p = .84. Note that given our model was just-identified (i.e., we had two
excluded instruments for two endogenous predictors), we were again
not able to test for the validity of the constraint made, that is, whether
overconfidence scores and sex only affected perceptions of leadership
suitability through their effect on perceptions of competence and con-
fidence (i.e., the exclusion restriction). Theoretically, nonetheless, we
draw from previous theorizing (Anderson et al., 2012; von Hippel &
Trivers, 2011) in suggesting the effect of overconfidence of perceived
leadership suitability occurs solely because overconfidence is (mis)read
by others as denoting superior competence and appropriately calibrated
confidence.
In an exploratory manner informed by these results, we decided to
run an IV specification with only one mediator (perceived competence),
one instrument (measured overconfidence) and treated sex as a control
variable rather than as an excluded instrument. This model makes
empirical sense given the data at hand: Perceived competence is a
significant predictor of leadership suitability, and we have slightly
better instruments for perceived competence than we have for per-
ceived confidence. This analysis revealed perceived competence to be
significantly predicted by both sex b = 0.10, p = .01, and measured
overconfidence, b = 0.07, p = .02 (Note: Results for this first stage are
similar to the first stage of the full model). In turn, leadership suitability
was predicted by perceived competence, b = 1.12, p < .01. Testing the
strength of measured overconfidence, which served as our instrument
for perceived competence yielded an F statistic of 5.25, p = .02, again
indicating a weak instrument. Testing the indirect effect yielded a sig-
nificant outcome, IE = 0.08, p = .02. Although tentative and ex-
ploratory, this model still suffers from weak instruments. In all cases,
the reduced form model, in which leadership suitability is predicted by
overconfidence scores and sex, is consistent and the only model that can
inform policy. In this model, perceptions of leadership suitability were
significantly predicted by both measured overconfidence b = 0.08,
p = .02, and sex b = 0.11, p = .01.
Discussion
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, participants' overconfidence – mea-
sured objectively as confidence over and above competence on a gen-
eral knowledge test – was positively related to raters' appraisals of
leadership suitability. We emphasize that raters saw only 30-s silent
clips of participants' job talks. This effect emerged regardless of whether
raters saw objective evidence of candidates' high versus low compe-
tence. Further, and providing support for Hypothesis 3, our PROCESS
results suggest that this effect was simultaneously mediated by per-
ceptions of confidence and competence. However, we present only
suggestive evidence for these pathways as all the models that we ex-
plored are untrustworthy to some extent, with the OLS (i.e., PROCESS)
appearing to be the least trustworthy. We thus suggest interpreting the
results of our mediation analyses with big caveats given the pervading
endogeneity in our model.
In contrast to Study 1, and inconsistent with Hypothesis 2, we found
that participants were able to accurately infer candidates' over-
confidence, although this effect was weak in comparison to the effects
of the GKQ on perceived competence and confidence, and we found no
evidence of indirect effects on leadership suitability via perceived
overconfidence. It is notable however that the detection of candidates'
overconfidence seems to occur only when raters are exposed to non-
verbal displays in the absence of verbal communication (as in Study 3),
but not when raters have access to both verbal and non-verbal displays
of overconfidence (as in Study 1). This raises the possibility that verbal
R. Ronay, et al. The Leadership Quarterly 30 (2019) 101316
12
communication may mask targets' overconfidence, making it more
difficult to disentangle displays of confidence from displays of over-
confidence. However, as we have no direct test of this possibility we
raise it only as a potential avenue for future research.
Study 4
As per Study 3, we sought to test the possibility that behavioral
displays of confidence might exert a positive effect in the context of
leadership selection, even when that confidence is coupled with per-
ceptions of low competence. We addressed this question via a sample of
US voters in the context of the US presidential pre-selection during
March–April 2016. We asked these voters to rate the confidence,
competence, and likelihood of their voting for each of the four re-
maining candidates – Ted Cruz, Hillary Clinton, Bernie Sanders, and
Donald Trump. We expected positive main effects for perceptions of
both candidate competence and confidence. Our critical question,
however, rested on the potentially interacting effects of confidence and
competence. Thus, we aimed to test whether the hypothesized positive
effects of candidate confidence on voting intentions would emerge re-
gardless of perceptions of candidate competence.
Methods
Based on the effects observed during pretesting, we recruited 300
US participants through Crowdflower and MTurk in April 2016. Prior to
analysis we removed cases that were incomplete, failed our attention
check, or duplicates (based on IP address), yielding a complete dataset
of N = 254 (125 females, Mage = 34.50, SD = 11.44). Of these parti-
cipants, 86.60% were registered to vote. Democrats (n = 95) provided
ratings (i.e., confidence, competence, and voting intention) for Hillary
Clinton and Bernie Sanders, and Republicans (n = 85) provided ratings
for Donald Trump and Ted Cruz, while Independents (n = 74) provided
ratings for all four candidates. We presented the candidates in a ran-
domized order and participants rated candidate competence, con-
fidence, and indicated the likelihood of their voting for each candidate.
Participants rated the confidence level of candidates on a scale from
0 = extremely unconfident to 100 = extremely confident. In this parti-
cular context, we could not manipulate or objectively measure com-
petence (as in Study 3). For this reason, we asked participants to rate
how effective candidates would be at handling 11 political issues, in-
cluding the federal budget deficit, poverty and homelessness, economic
conditions, the drug problem, environmental issues, the abortion issue,
education policy, the situation(s) in Central America and the Middle East,
terrorist threats within America, and refugee problems, on a 7-point scale
from 1 = extremely ineffective and 7 = extremely effective. Cronbach's
alpha varied between 0.97 and 0.98.
To measure our dependent variable – voting intentions for candi-
dates – we asked participants, “If the election were taking place TODAY,
how likely would you be to vote for presidential candidate X?” and mea-
sured their responses on a 7-point scale anchored by 1 = extremely
unlikely and 7 = extremely likely.
We asked participants to indicate their gender, age, political or-
ientation (0 = extremely left wing to 10 = extremely right wing), and
subjective social economic status on a 10 rung self-anchoring scale
(Singh-Manoux, Adler, & Marmot, 2003) and controlled for these
variables in all analyses.
Results
Table 4 provides the descriptives and bivariate correlations between
our measured variables.
Our primary interest was in assessing the generalized effects of
confidence and competence on voting intentions, so we fitted a linear
mixed effects model to the data and tested for the fixed effects of
competence, confidence, their interaction term, and all controls. To
control for candidate effects, we added candidate as a repeated func-
tion. We standardized confidence, competence, and voting intentions
for ease of interpretation. In line with Hypothesis 3, results revealed the
expected main effects for competence, b = 0.72, 95%CI[0.66, 0.77], t
(445.48) = 25.54, p < .001, d = 2.42, confidence, b = 0.16, 95%CI
[0.10, 0.23], t(542.86) = 5.07, p < .001, d = 0.44, and their interac-
tion, b = 0.09, 95%CI[0.04–0.14], t(526.79) = 3.57, p < .001,
d = 0.31.
Examination of the simple slopes (Fig. 2) revealed that confidence
was positively related to voting intentions at high levels of competence,
b = 0.25, 95%CI[0.16,0.35], t(570.93) = 5.09, p < .001, d = 0.43.
And despite the significant interaction between confidence and com-
petence, even at low levels of competence, confidence had a weaker,
though still significant positive relationship with voting intentions,
b = 0.07, 95%CI[0.02,0.13], t(429.62) = 2.48, p = .01, d = 0.24.
Robustness checks revealed that the results were functionally un-
changed when we excluded our identified covariates from the model:
confidence, b = 0.16, SE = 0.03, 95%CI[0.09,0.22], t(505.20) = 4.98,
p < .001, d = 0.44; competence, b = 0.71, SE = 0.03, 95%CI
[0.65,0.76], t(454.77) = 25.64, p < .001, d= 2.40; interaction,
b = 0.09, SE = 0.02, 95%CI[0.04,0.14], t(525.09) = 3.54, p < .001,
d = 0.31.
Discussion
Among partisans and independents alike, confidence appeared as
the optimal candidate strategy, regardless of perceived competence.
Confidence showed a positive and significant effect on voting inten-
tions, higher when coupled with high competence, somewhat weaker
but still significant when coupled with low competence. These findings
from a real world political context are consistent with our experimental
results from Study 3; candidates' overconfidence, either measured ob-
jectively through the GKQ or assessed through the interacting effects of
perceived confidence and competence, is positively related to leader-
ship suitability ratings.
It is worth noting that as the US sits at the high end of the self-
promotion scale (Twenge & Campbell, 2009), the current findings
should be examined in cultural contexts that vary in the extent to which
self-promotion is endorsed (Loughnan et al., 2011; Meisel, Ning,
Campbell, & Goodie, 2016; Yates et al., 1997). In cultures that sit to-
ward the low end (Yamagishi, 1988), negative effects of overconfidence
might be more pronounced, and/or the moderating effect of compe-
tence on confidence might be stronger. We might expect similar var-
iations in organizational cultures to amplify or attenuate the social
advantages of overconfidence. Nonetheless, within the political climate
at the time of study, the advantages appear to have trumped the dis-
advantages.
Study 5
To explore possible longer term societal consequences of such a
political climate, Study 5 modeled the effects of perceived confidence
and competence on voting intentions as observed in Study 4 using an
agent based simulation. Our goals were to examine: (1) whether over-
confidence emerges as an adaptive strategic signal for attracting votes,
(2) the consequences of candidates' overconfidence for voting behavior,
and (3) the consequences of confidence signaling for election outcomes.
Method
We set up a modified Moran-process model (Moran, 1962; Nowak,
2006) that allowed us to examine (i) how candidates' overconfidence
evolves in discrete time when defeated candidates imitate successful
candidates, (ii) how this process affects the levels of election turnout,
and (iii) the likelihood that competent candidates win elections.
Candidates in our model were characterized by two traits: a con-
stant competence level, k, and an adaptable confidence strategy, c. We
assumed that competence is a fixed trait determined by nature that
cannot be influenced by the candidates. Thus, we assumed k ~ N(0, 1).
However, we accounted for the possibility that candidates can adapt
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their level of strategic display of overconfidence, c, which we initialized
as c ~ N(0, 0.1).
In every time step of our simulation, four candidates were randomly
selected from a candidate pool of 100 individuals and competed in an
election. First, we calculated the probabilities of being voted for by an
average voter for each of the four candidates. For this we employed a
logistic function.
= +P i v(‘vote for candidate ’) 1/[1 exp( )],i (1)
with
= + +v k c k c ,i i i i i1 2 3 (2)
wherein ci and ki were candidate i's confidence strategy and competence
level and the coefficients βj, j = 1,2,3, were those estimated in Study 4.
Setting Eqs. (1) and (2) up like this yields that the attractiveness of
candidates to voters in the simulation, i.e. their probability of being
voted for, follows the same general patterns we observed in Study 4.
Second, we determined the outcome of an electoral competition be-
tween the four candidates using the following procedure: (Step 1) The
four candidates were put into random order. (Step 2) Candidate 1 was
presented to an average voter, i.e., with probability P(‘vote for candi-
date 1’) the first candidate was voted for. In the event that candidate 1
was not voted for, candidate 2 was presented to the voter and voted for
with probability P(‘vote for candidate 2’), and so on. If, eventually, the
voter did not vote for any of the four candidates, this voter was counted
as a nonvoter.
To determine the outcome of an election, Steps 1 and 2 were re-
peated 1000 times, modeling a population of 1000 voters. For simpli-
city, we assumed that the winner of the election was that candidate who
was able to win a simple majority of the votes. After the outcome of the
election in a given time step of the simulation had been determined, the
three candidates who did not win this election updated their confidence
strategies. They did so by ‘imitating the best’, i.e., they copied the
confidence strategy of that candidate who just won the election.
However, in doing so they made mistakes, which we modeled as nor-
mally distributed random errors in the copying process:
closer = cwinner + ε, where ε ~ N(0, 0.5). i.i.d. for each defeated candi-
date.
One iteration of the simulation consisted of two phases: We in-
itialized a population of 100 candidates (Phase 1) and we ran 2000
elections with subsequent strategy updating of the defeated candidates
(Phase 2). The results presented below and displayed in Fig. 3 were
obtained by averaging over the outcomes of 250 iterations of the si-
mulation. The simulation was implemented in R 3.2.3.
Results and discussion
Our simulations yield a clear cut result: When candidates con-
tinuously face voter preferences as we observed them in Study 4, they
Table 4
Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations for Study 4.
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Age 34.40 11.53
2. Gender 0.51 0.50 −0.25⁎⁎
3. Political orientation 5.13 2.33 0.11⁎⁎ 0.10⁎
4. Social economic status 5.90 1.63 0.06 −0.12⁎⁎ −0.13⁎
5. Confidence 0.00 1.00 0.17⁎⁎ −0.14⁎⁎ −0.08⁎ 0.03
6. Competence 0.00 1.00 0.03 −0.02 0.01 −0.16⁎⁎ 0.40⁎⁎
7. Confidence X competence 0.41 1.10 0.02 −0.07 0.20⁎⁎ −0.06 −0.39⁎⁎ 0.01
8. Voting intention 3.94 2.32 0.02 −0.03 0.01 −0.08⁎ 0.39⁎⁎ 0.76⁎⁎ 0.05
Note. Democrats (n= 95) and Republicans (n = 85) provided ratings for two candidates and Independents (n = 74) provided ratings for four candidates, resulting in
a total number of 642 candidate ratings. Gender was coded as 0 = female and 1 = male. Political orientation was measured on a scale from 0 = extremely left wing
to 10 = extremely right wing. Social economic status was measured on a 10-point scale. Perceptions of confidence and competence are standardized scores. Voting
intention was measured on a 7-point scale.
⁎ p < .05.
⁎⁎ p < .01.
Fig. 2. Study 4. Simple slopes of the interaction between confidence and
competence on voting intentions. Slopes were achieved by recentering at ± 1
SD from the mean of competence. “High” and “low” confidence refer to ± 1 SD
from the mean of confidence.
Fig. 3. Study 5. Simulation results. Solid line: average confidence strategy (left
y-scale); dashed line: average election turnout (in percent, right y-scale); dotted
line: share of elections won by most competent competitor (in percent, right y-
scale). Shaded areas indicate ± 1 SD around the means. Mean lines were
smoothed for clearer display.
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are incentivized to engage in an arms race for ever increasing levels of
overconfidence. As can be seen in Fig. 3 (solid line), the average con-
fidence strategy steadily increased in all iterations of the simulation.
Given that Studies 1 through 4 found no adverse effects of high levels of
perceived confidence, this was to be expected. Our simulation also
shows, however, that the confidence arms race which candidates en-
gage in has two noteworthy consequences. First, by continuously in-
creasing their attractiveness to voters through imitating more successful
competitors, candidates also motivate more and more people to vote
(Fig. 3, dashed line). While this effect likely occurs positive to most, the
confidence arms race also has an important downside. As can be seen in
Fig. 3 (dotted line), the more candidates compensate for inferior com-
petence by increasing confidence display, the less likely it becomes that
the most competent competitor eventually wins an election.
While our simulation model naturally is based on several simplifi-
cations and abstractions, it does capture at least one important con-
sequence of the voting preferences that we observed in Study 4: as long
as high perceived confidence that is coupled with low perceived com-
petence is not perceived as overconfidence, i.e. as long as braggadocio
is not punished by voters, the average quality of elected candidates is
likely to suffer in the longer run. This conclusion, however, is based on
the assumption of time-fixed voting preferences. If voters were able to
change their preferences as a reaction to less competent candidates
being elected, the dismal prediction our simulation model yields would
be debilitated.
General discussion
Across four studies that combined field, laboratory, and experi-
mental data, we found a consistent positive relationship between
overconfidence and leadership ratings. We interpret these findings as
evidence that overconfidence is interpersonally functional in leadership
selection and attribute this to two observed reasons. Firstly, our data
from Studies 1, 2, and 3 demonstrate that overconfidence gives rise to
self-promoting behavioral signals that others interpret as the accurately
calibrated confidence of a superior candidate, even when accompanied
by objective evidence of the candidate's competence. Secondly, Study 2
provides suggestive evidence (endogeneity concerns remain and may
well be biasing our coefficients) that this self-directed subterfuge buf-
fers leadership candidates from an unsettling affective reaction to social
stress, thus providing a palliative balm that boosts performance and
social evaluation in the context of leadership selection. In Study 4 we
shifted our focus from directly measuring people's overconfidence to
examining how perceptions of confidence, competence, and their in-
teraction relate to voting intentions. Consistent with our experimental
data from Study 3, we saw that voters' perceptions of candidates' con-
fidence positively predicted voting intentions, even when those same
voters deemed the candidate incompetent. Finally, when we modeled
the longer-term consequences of these voter preferences in Study 5, we
saw unfettered confidence emerge as a runaway strategy that was ac-
companied by steadily decreasing competence of elected leaders.
Theoretical implications
First, we suggest that the relationship between (over)confidence and
perceptions of leadership potential observed in these studies positions
(over)confidence as an intrapsychic antecedent that manifests leader-
prototypic behaviors, triggering people's implicit leadership theories.
The ubiquity of practitioner-focused articles on the importance of
confidence to effective leadership suggests that confidence is a strongly
sought-after quality among leaders and aspiring leaders. For instance,
Forbes (Lipman, 2017) published an article describing “Why Con-
fidence is Always a Leader's Best Friend”, inc.com (2008) offered
“Without Confidence, There is No Leadership”, and HBR (Bregman,
2018) declared that “Great Leaders are Confident, Connected, Com-
mitted, and Courageous”. These practitioner pieces not only reflect a
widely shared sentiment that confidence is a necessary quality for a
leader to possess, but follow also from longstanding associations be-
tween confidence and leadership within the scientific literature (e.g.,
Stogdill, 1948). Indeed, Judge, Bono, Ilies, and Gerhardt (2002) report
in their qualitative review and meta-analysis of the trait perspective in
leadership research that “self-confidence” appears in all but two of the
review papers that preceded their own work (Bass, 1990; Daft, 1999;
House & Aditya, 1997; Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1991; Northouse, 1997;
Stogdill, 1948; Yukl, 1998; Yukl & Van Fleet, 1992). Locke (1991, p. 26)
goes so far as to state “that self-confidence is a necessary trait for suc-
cessful leadership is undisputed.” It is surprising then that confidence
has not yet been explicitly identified as a component of implicit lea-
dership theory. Our findings lend strong support to the role of con-
fidence as an antecedent of many of the behaviors found to activate
people's implicit leadership theories (i.e., outgoing, determined, deci-
sive, strong character, strong convictions, charismatic, persuasive,
persistent, outspoken). Further, our findings suggest that not just con-
fidence but overconfidence too manifests the same behavioral expres-
sions, triggering implicit theories of leadership which positively influ-
ence evaluations of leadership potential.
Second, our findings extend standing accounts of overconfidence in
leadership that to date have focused on the suggestion that the psy-
chological experience of power that accompanies a leadership role
leads to higher levels of overconfidence (Fast et al., 2012). Our results
provide clear evidence that overconfidence precedes leadership selec-
tion, although we expect that subsequent increases in power and
prestige may exacerbate the expression of this trait.
Third, our results suggest that overconfidence provides a clear social
utility, a finding which complements long standing explanations of self-
enhancement as serving an intrapersonal function in the maintenance
of self-esteem (Dunning et al., 1995; Taylor & Brown, 1988). We offer
evidence that overconfidence increases perceptions of leadership po-
tential by freeriding on the information value that observers derive
from behavioral expressions of confidence and competence.
Fourth, using Brunswik's (1956) lens as a framework, we isolate and
demonstrate the functional relationship between the intra- and inter-
personal effects of overconfidence. We argue that these interpersonal
benefits follow from the self-deceptive nature of overconfidence (von
Hippel & Trivers, 2011) wherein overconfidence manifests as indis-
tinguishable from accurately calibrated confidence. We suggest that in
the short run such interpersonal advantages of overconfidence might
serve to mitigate any personal costs associated with erroneous judg-
ments that might arise from poorly calibrated self-knowledge. In other
words, although self-deceptive overconfidence may impair judgment of
future leaders (e.g., Ronay et al., 2017), its social utility in a selection
context is such that the net effect of overconfidence may not be espe-
cially costly for the individual. In the long run however, the costs of
errors in judgment are borne by all.
Our results from Study 2 point to the value of overconfidence as a
buffer against declining positive affect in response to social evaluation.
Our results suggest that this palliative association mediated the positive
relationship between overconfidence and presentation quality.
However, as our measure of affective robustness was not exogenous to
our design and our instrument to address this weak, we encourage fu-
ture research to test the robustness of our causal claims by using
stronger instruments. Nonetheless, theoretically we suggest that be-
cause overconfidence leads people to estimate and track their own
performance in an unrealistically positive way, they experience fewer
moments of self-doubt and remain affectively robust in the context of
social evaluation. As a result, their behaviors appear as strong and
appropriately calibrated confidence. Our results from Study 1 suggest
that this intrapsychic cushioning might also facilitate the (perceived)
ability to manage pressure effectively, and to cope well with change
and setbacks. Pressure, change, and setbacks are all potentially stress
inducing, and so even an unrealistically steadfast belief in one's ability
to traverse such uncertainties would presumably promote adaptive




Considering the detrimental outcomes associated with over-
confident leaders (e.g., Schrand & Zechman, 2012; Simon & Houghton,
2003), organizations should consider whether overconfidence is a trait
worth screening for before promoting people to positions of power and
influence. For example, instead of relying on holistic selection ap-
proaches, organizations might make more use of objective selection
aids to select future leaders. Although HR professionals are typically
well aware of the limitations associated with unstructured interviews,
they sometimes still contend that unstructured interviews allow them to
“read between the lines” and see for themselves whether someone is
worth hiring (Highhouse, 2008; Lievens et al., 2005). Our finding that
overconfidence was undetectable to selection consultants and indeed
positively predicted their hiring recommendations suggests that lea-
dership selection programs should be based on tests and exercises in
which candidates can demonstrate their actual knowledge, skills, and
abilities, allowing strong displays of confidence to be objectively
benchmarked by observers right away.
Second, organizations could consider including a measure of over-
confidence in their leadership selection procedures. The benefits of
measuring overconfidence and being able to control for this trait during
candidate selection clearly outweigh the modest cost of adding this
non-invasive measure that takes no longer than a few minutes to
complete. As our findings revealed that miscalibrated confidence on the
GKQ (Michailova, 2010) was strongly related to miscalibrated con-
fidence in presentation skills, we suggest a measure such as the GKQ is a
generalizable tool for assessing self-enhancement. Moreover, the ease of
assessing individual overconfidence provides feedback opportunities in
the context of leadership development programs.
Our data from Study 4 speaks to the compelling nature of over-
confidence in high stakes leadership selection contests – high levels of
perceived confidence yielded an overall positive effect on voting in-
tentions. The robust relationship we observed was driven by the posi-
tive relationship between confidence and voting intentions, when
confidence was matched by competence. However, even at low levels of
competence strong confidence continued to yield a positive relationship
with voting intentions. When we plugged this observed relationship
into a simulation model, confidence emerged as a runaway strategy for
attracting votes, which, in turn, negatively affected the average com-
petence level of the candidates elected. Thus, our findings suggest that
overconfidence – versus underconfidence, or even appropriate levels of
confidence – was the least costly error among American presidential
candidates in 2016.
Limitations and future directions
We acknowledge several limitations that serve as avenues for future
research. First, we used the same measurement instrument across stu-
dies, which limits the generalizability of our findings. Although over-
precision has been described as the most reliable way to measure
overconfidence (Moore & Healy, 2008; Moore & Schatz, 2017; Moore &
Swift, 2010), previous works have shown that the three different
strands of overconfidence (i.e., overprecision, overestimation, and
overplacement) manifest themselves differently under different condi-
tions, and have different origins and consequences (Moore & Healy,
2008; Moore & Schatz, 2017). Hence, whether operationalizations of
overconfidence other than overprecision would result in the same ef-
fects remains to be tested. One hypothesis for future research might be
that measuring overconfidence specifically in one's leadership skills and
abilities might lead to stronger effects within the context of leadership
selection as individuals motivated toward leadership should be more
likely to enhance their self-perceptions within contexts where their
personal motivations are strongest.
Second, whereas our findings suggest that overconfidence might
come at the expense of group and organizational outcomes, we did not
investigate longer-term outcomes of overconfidence in the workplace.
Future research should address this question by taking a multilevel
approach, in terms of considering individual, group, and organizational
outcomes of overconfidence over time. Moreover, future research might
consider boundary conditions, such as group composition factors or
task characteristics, which may facilitate or hinder the effects of over-
confidence in the workplace.
The current research is the first to identify a relationship between
overconfidence and affective robustness in the context of social stress.
We further find suggestive evidence that affective robustness mediates
the relationship between overconfidence and panel ratings of pre-
sentations. However, as our mediating variable was not exogenous to
our study, and the instrument we employed to address this weak, future
research might seek to test the robustness of the evidence we present
here. More broadly, future work might explore whether the relationship
between overconfidence and stress is limited to socially stressful con-
texts, or would it generalize to other forms of stress and stress induc-
tion? This might have implications for overconfident leaders' decisions
and behaviors in times of crisis, along with attributions of over-
confident leaders in crisis situations. We think this is an interesting vein
for future research to explore.
Future research might also explore the broader antecedents and
consequences of overconfidence. For instance, overconfidence may
emerge as a competitive strategy in response to conditions of inequality
(Loughnan et al., 2011; Ronay, Maddux, & von Hippel, in press). At-
tractiveness might also be related to overconfidence, such that the
significant advantages associated with attractiveness (Maestripieri,
Henry, & Nickels, 2017) might over time lead to an inflated sense of
confidence. On the other hand, overconfidence might itself lead to at-
tributions of greater attractiveness, or physical attractiveness might
interact with overconfidence to influence attributions of competence, or
even charisma. We can also imagine that observers might infer some-
what different qualities from men's versus women's behavioral displays
of overconfidence (Rudman & Glick, 2001), or that observers' char-
acteristics (e.g., their own levels of overconfidence or competence)
might interact with the effects of overconfidence in leadership selection
contexts. Finally, times of crisis might interact with leadership candi-
dates' overconfidence to influence follower attributions and voting in-
tentions. While beyond the scope of the present set of studies, future
research can test these possibilities.
Conclusion
These studies offer converging evidence that overconfidence pro-
vides an interpersonal savoir fare that has tangible benefits within the
context of leadership selection. In part, this follows from an in-
trapsychic buffering against social stress that overconfidence affords,
facilitating self-promoting behavioral signals which selection panels
infer to reflect true competence and leadership potential. Our data also
suggest that the current political climate, at least within the US, is well
suited to overconfident candidates and that this might well be a match
that stands the tests of time. While this is perhaps good news for the
overconfident (although we expect they knew it all along), the results of
our simulation model reveal longer term costs in terms of leader com-
petence. It is perhaps a prudent moment for groups, organizations, and
countries to consider what kind of leaders they really want. When faced
with the seductive allures of overconfidence, we might do well to at
least consider the less ostentatious virtues of humility.
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